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Abstract 
 
Identifiability to an audience is an integral part of social life. It has powerful effects on 
behaviour. Some authors have argued that “deindividuation”, or a lowered sense of personal 
identifiability results in a loss of control over individual behaviour in a group situation. 
However, this has been contested. This study examines the Social Identity Model of 
Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) and reputational theory as alternatives to traditional models of 
deindividuation. The SIDE model argues that the salience of personal versus social identity – 
and therefore the salience of different sets of norms or standards – govern social behaviour, 
while in contrast, reputational theory suggests that behaviour is governed by a group heuristic 
which ensures individuals gain and maintain access to generalized systems of exchange. 
VIAPPL (see www.viappl.org) was used to investigate the effects of various conditions of 
identifiability on ingroup favouritism, selfishness and reciprocity in an interactive, virtual 
environment. The results were then examined in order to determine whether the SIDE model 
or reputational theory were supported.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Social scientists have been fascinated by the effects of “anonymity” or a lack of direct 
identifiability on individuals’ behaviour within specific social situations. Deindividuation 
theories, developed from Le Bons ideas of crowd psychology, suggest that when immersed in 
groups, individuals’ behaviours become disinhibited and they are more likely to partake in 
behaviour that is not aligned with their personal standards. However, such theories have been 
contested as they do not provide a sufficient explanation for behaviour.  
Some theories have since become much more complex and sophisticated, suggesting that 
individuals do not, “lose their minds” or their inhibitions, but rather behave according to social 
norms and salient social identities. For example, the Social Identity model of Deindividuation 
Effects (SIDE) explores the idea that for members of social groups, the audience to whom they 
are visible becomes a strong determinant of how they choose to behave because it effects the 
salience of their two identities – personal and social (Reicher, Spears & Postmes, 1995).  
An alternative explanation to the SIDE model is one which focuses on reputational factors 
within social situations. Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) suggest that social groups provide 
systems of generalized exchange, where individuals within the system can gain access to 
resources – provided they maintain a good reputation and are seen to cooperate with the group 
by other group members. This theory suggests that individuals behave according to a group 
heuristic, which is a default assumption or mental shortcut that individuals use which aids them 
in navigating social situations and prevents them from partaking in risky behaviours that could 
lead to exclusion from the exchange system. When they are visible to others and can be held 
responsible for their behaviours (and therefore can be treated in a particular way by other group 
members), they behave according to the group heuristic.  
Both of the above theories provide explanations which are arguably more theoretically sound 
than traditional theorising about deindividuation or group mind – however, a review of the 
literature does not provide robust answers for which theory provides a better overall account 
of the determinants of behaviour in a social context. 
The Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL) was used to examine how varying conditions of 
identifiability and status would affect participants behaviours –namely ingroup favouritism, 
selfishness and reciprocity – during a game-like token allocation experiment. This 
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experimental method allows for the study of behavioural norms as they emerge over time in 
interaction.  
By analysing the interactive behaviours of participants, it was possible to compare the SIDE 
model and reputational theory as potential explanations for behaviour, in order to determine 
which of the two provided a more robust account. While various studies have employed the 
use of minimal groups to examine intergroup behaviour at its most basic level, the present study 
is unique in that it explores the effects of visibility to various audiences rather than just simply 
examining anonymity. Additionally, it provides an insight to the emergence of normative 
behaviours under such circumstances – something which has not been examined to date.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Identifiability and anonymity have been of interest to social psychologists for some time due 
to their interesting effects on the behaviours of individuals within social groups. According to 
Oxford’s English Dictionary (2010), identifiability refers to the “quality of being identifiable” 
– which in turn means “able to be identified”. The verb identify (in Oxford English Dictionary, 
2010) is defined as “to ascertain or assert what a thing or who a person is”. Therefore, 
identifiability could be defined as the quality of others being able to ascertain who a person is. 
In contrast, to be anonymous (Oxford English Dictionary, 2010), refers to being “generally 
unknown, unrecognized, or uncelebrated”. Anonymity could then be defined as 
“unrecognizability” or “unknowability” – a situation where an identity cannot be attributed to 
a specific person – one does not know who they are. Identifiability and anonymity could be 
described as contrasting conditions, sitting on opposite poles of a spectrum which encompasses 
the visibility of an individual’s personal identity to other people. While both have been studied 
fairly extensively in the social psychology literature, anonymity seems to be a hot topic due to 
its perceived role in more extreme or unacceptable forms of social behaviour. However, 
interestingly, there are some real-world examples which suggest that anonymity itself might 
not be a precondition for extreme behaviour.  
On 16 August 2012, at the Lonmin mine, in South Africa, police opened fire on a group of 
protesting mine workers, in full view of the media (De Waal, 2012). Known as the Marikana 
Tragedy, this shooting resulted in the deaths of thirty-four mine workers, and the injury of 
seventy-eight (Twala, 2012). Makhetha (2018), a news journalist, suggests that it was “the 
single most lethal use of force by South African security forces against civilians since 1960”. 
In this situation, the behaviour of the police officers involved – who were all personally 
identifiable and accountable for their actions – seems inconceivable, if anonymity is the factor 
usually leading to this kind of behaviour.  
Three frameworks which theorise how anonymity shapes behaviour include traditional models 
of deindividuation (see review by Reicher & Levine, 1994), the social identity model of 
deindividuation effects (SIDE) (Reicher, Spears & Postmes, 1995) and the group heuristic 
model or reputational perspective (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). While there appear to be 
exemplars and evidence for all three theories, the literature is inconclusive about what social 
psychological processes are actually at play when it comes to behaviour in conditions of 
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anonymity. This thesis highlights why traditional models of deindividuation may be 
insufficient to explain why anonymity affects behaviour in the way that it does, then examines 
the two alternative theories which may offer answers – one from a social identity perspective, 
and the other from a reputational perspective. 
Deindividuation and accountability 
Traditional models of deindividuation suggest that in many cases, individuals can be 
considered as anonymous members of a larger social group. It is suggested that often their 
behaviours reflect this – they lose their inhibition and act as group members rather than as 
individuals, partaking in behaviours that would usually be deemed unacceptable or 
inappropriate according to personal standards – a phenomenon termed “deindividuation” 
(Reicher & Levine, 1994).  
Deindividuation refers to the lowered level of private self-awareness within a group situation, 
which then decreases an individual’s self-regulatory functions, leading to disinhibited and often 
socially unacceptable behaviours. Deindividuation is often cited as an effect of group 
belonging, and various studies have been undertaken to determine whether it is indeed the 
causal explanation for disinhibited behaviour. Early theories argued that deindividuation as a 
phenomenon occurs as a result of various situational factors, including physiological arousal, 
anonymity, being part of a group and a lack of personal responsibility (Bovasso, 1997). In some 
situations, these factors interact and cause individuals to perform behaviours that they would 
not usually partake in if they were not part of a group. 
According to Postmes and Spears (1997) traditional models of deindividuation suggest that 
when individuals are part of a crowd or group, “members do not pay attention to other 
individuals as individuals and do not feel scrutinized. Being unidentified and thereby 
unaccountable has the psychological consequence of reducing inner restraints and increasing 
behaviour that is usually inhibited” (p. 239).  
 
This suggests that anonymity results in a lowered sense of personal identifiability which can 
lead to a loss of individual identity and therefore a loss of control over personal behaviour. This 
results in behaviours that are no longer governed by an individual’s internal, personal 
standards. This loss of internal control is argued to be linked to the spread of violent or unruly 
behaviour that is sometimes experienced during events such as protest marches or riots. In other 
words, according to these traditional theories, because individuals see themselves as 
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anonymous members of a group, their behaviour becomes disinhibited and they are more likely 
to act in socially unacceptable ways due to the lack of fear of being held responsible for their 
actions. Therefore, whether one is identifiable to some authority or not has an impact on how 
an individual may choose to behave. This suggests that an individual’s level of accountability 
for their behaviour is directly affected by whether they are identifiable and can be held 
responsible.  
There are countless real-world examples where identifiability and anonymity appear to affect 
the behaviour of individuals within social situations. The media is rife with stories and videos 
going viral online of police violence at such events, with the dispersal of rubber bullets and 
teargas into the protesting crowd. The use of force by police officers often creates distrust of 
the authorities amongst members of the public, and for this reason it is becoming more 
common-place for police-officers to use body-worn cameras when on duty (Ariel, Farrar & 
Sutherland, 2015).  Ariel et al.’s (2015) experimental study indicated that increasing 
identifiability and accountability for actions via the use of body-worn cameras acted as a 
deterrent to unacceptable behaviour for both police officers and members of the public, when 
compared to a control condition where no cameras were worn. Attempts such as this to control 
and inhibit peoples’ behaviour through increasing their visibility to some kind of authority 
indicates that identifiability (or lack thereof) could indeed be a factor that may affect 
behaviours within specific situations or contexts.  
Another situation which suggests that identifiability affects behaviour is in the use of flaming 
language on online discussion boards or media platforms. Flaming language refers to “hostile 
emotional expressions characterised by using insulting profane or offensive languages, which 
may inflict harm on a person or an organisation resulting from disinhibited behaviour” (Cho & 
Kwon, 2015, p. 364).  
Flaming language – in the forms of racism, sexism and homophobia – is often seen in 
Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC), particularly where those who use pseudonyms or 
remain anonymous. Kling, Lee, Teich and Frankel (1999) argue that while anonymity allows 
for free speech, it also provides opportunities for individuals to take part in hate speech, 
deception and impersonation – usually without any repercussions for their actions. Often this 
leads to reciprocation of profanities and verbal attacks, creating what have been termed 
“flaming norms” in online communities (Cho & Kwon, 2015). In face to face interaction, 
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hostility and offensive language are generally frowned upon, and so it is interesting that these 
behaviours can be common in CMC.  
It has been suggested that identifiability may determine what kinds of behaviours individuals 
are willing to display when using these types of online forums. It seems that the less identifiable 
people are, the more disinhibited their behaviour becomes due to the absence of accountability 
for their actions (Cho & Kwon, 2015). Therefore, on an online discussion board, anonymous 
individuals may be more likely to partake in hate speech due to the absence of sanctions against 
their behaviour. It has also been suggested that different forms of online communication may 
differ in the amount and intensity of flaming language that occurs. Halpern and Gibbs (2013) 
found that Youtube contains significantly more flaming language than Facebook. Both 
Facebook and Youtube can be considered social media platforms, however their purposes are 
quite different and the level of personal information an individual discloses on each also differs. 
Most Facebook profiles divulge far more information than Youtube about a person’s identity 
– such as their name, what they look like, where they live and who they have connections with 
– as it is a social networking site used to connect with friends and acquaintances. Youtube, on 
the other hand, allows for an individual to use pseudonym-type usernames which do not reveal 
anything about who they actually are – as the purpose of this platform is not necessarily to 
connect with people one knows, but rather to watch and comment on videos about whatever 
topic is of interest. While Youtube does allow for interaction, the level of personal 
identifiability of users is arguably somewhat less than that of Facebook. The authors suggest 
this heightened level of anonymity on Youtube could be a factor contributing to the differences 
in flaming language between the two platforms (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013).  
In more of an everyday, common example of the effects of anonymity on behaviour, something 
that happens in various group contexts, from sports teams, to groups of students and groups 
within corporate organisations, is referred to as social loafing. Social loafing or free-riding 
refers to the reduction in the effort that individuals’ put into a collective or group task 
(Gammage et al., 2001).  Hogg (1992) suggests that a perception of personal identifiability 
leads to a decrease in social loafing due to the fact that one is more aware of potential evaluation 
by other members of the group. Because behaviour is directly attributable to the individual, 
they are more likely to work to their full potential than to make a half-hearted effort. In contrast, 
when an individual’s inputs are anonymous, there is a lowered sense of personal identifiability 
– and it is suggested that this can result in increased social loafing.  
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While it seems to make sense that the lack of accountability which is so often associated with 
anonymity can affect the behaviour of individuals, recently the deindividuation model of 
mindless and disinhibited behaviour in the collective context has been disputed. There are 
various examples of individuals “behaving badly” despite being identifiable and accountable 
for their actions. For example, sometimes we see police brutality – despite there being 
surveillance, and despite the fact that arguably, they can be held accountable for their actions. 
When this happens, it seems that there is another underlying reason or motivation for their 
choice of behaviour. 
Take for example the Marikana tragedy which occurred on 16 August 2012 at the Lonmin 
mine, in South Africa. In this particular event, the South African police fired at a crowd of 
striking mineworkers, killing thirty-four and wounding seventy-eight (Twala, 2012). The 
traditional model of deindividuation somehow fails to explain this particular event. Taking a 
life can be argued to be a much more extreme form of behaviour than acts of vandalism and 
the types of unruly behaviour that can occur during protests. Arguing that these officers simply 
behaved in a disinhibited way due to being part of a “crowd” simply doesn’t add up. 
Furthermore, in this case both the striking miners and the police were aware of the presence of 
the media, due to the fact that the media were situated safely behind the lines of police, in view 
of the oncoming mineworkers (De Waal, 2012), suggesting they would be aware that there 
would be witnesses, as well as photographic and video evidence of the events that unfolded. 
Du Preez (2015) states that the images and video footage of the massacre were viewed 
worldwide. Therefore, the police’s actions would be visible to various external audiences and 
open to interpretation – and they were aware of this. 
The rationale behind Ariel et al.’s (2015) argument that visibility and identifiability will 
prevent individuals from behaving badly is therefore not supported by an example like the one 
above. It becomes clear then that theoretically, the deindividuation model of behaviour does 
not sufficiently explain events where individuals act in what would be deemed socially 
unacceptable ways despite being identifiable and accountable for their actions.  
It is no surprise then, that Postmes and Spears (see review, 1997) argue that it has limitations. 
The main issue is that deindividuation theory appears to neglect the possibility that crowd 
behaviour may result from group norms within the social situation, rather than loss of control 
over behaviour.  Distinguishing between general social norms and those behaviours normative 
to specific social situations is important. Postmes and Spears (see review, 1997) argue that 
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general social norms (such as always being polite to others or avoiding confrontation) may not 
apply in specific social contexts, for specific social groups. What might appear to be counter 
normative or irrational for a social group in one situation could actually be reasonable and 
normative behaviour when seen from the perspective of a member of a different group in a 
similar situation.  
 
In line with these observations, social psychologists have provided alternative explanations for 
the causal effects of so-called “deindividuation” phenomena. One of these, named the social 
identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE), considers the fact that certain norms may be 
salient in particular contexts (Reicher et al., 1995). This theory may provide explanations for 
phenomena that cannot be rationalised by traditional models of deindividuation. 
 
The Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) 
The social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE) was developed in order to make 
sense of the way in which certain situational factors (or deindividuation manipulations) such 
as anonymity can result in a range of behaviours in group members, rather than in disinhibition 
only (Klein et al., 2007). The SIDE model challenges the logic of traditional models of 
deindividuation by arguing that there are specific features of situations (such as anonymity, 
being part of a social group, reduced accountability and physiological arousal) which can 
influence the relative salience of personal and social identities, depending on the social context 
(Reicher et al., 1995). Personal and social identity represent two dimensions of an indivdiuals 
self-concept. Personal identity refers to an individual’s distinct identity, which allows them to 
see themselves as different or distinct from other individuals. Social identity, in contrast, refers 
to aspects of an individual’s identity which define who they are in terms of how they categorize 
themselves at the social level, and aspects of their identity that make them similar to other 
individuals, allowing them to see themselves as part of a specific social group (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979).  
Reicher et al. (1995) highlight the idea that immersion in a social group can increase the 
salience of the social identity of that group. They suggest that there is not a loss of control over 
behaviour, but rather a shift with regard to the salience of standards or norms which govern 
behaviour in the particular context. In other words, when a specific social identity is salient, an 
individual will behave according to the norms of that social group, rather than according to 
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personal standards. This is known as depersonalisation – an impact of deindividuation 
manipulations which is argued to be the cognitive component of the SIDE.  
Interestingly, while many deindividuation theorists seem to suggest that anonymity is mostly 
associated with extreme, negative forms of behaviour, Reicher et al. (1995) highlight that there 
are also cases where anonymity is actually followed by positive behavioural outcomes, for 
example, when good Samaritans help strangers who do not know them as individuals. To try 
and explain cases such as this by suggesting there is a “loss of control” over behaviour seems 
implausible.  
Therefore, instead of suggesting that being an anonymous group member results in a lack of 
behavioural control, SIDE suggests that the identity which is salient is a key factor in 
determining what kinds of behaviours come to the fore. They suggest that the effect of 
anonymity on behaviour is dependent on identity salience in the specific social context. When 
group identity is highly salient, and individuals are immersed in the group, they are much more 
likely to display group normative behaviours. In contrast, when immersed in a group and group 
identity is not particularly salient for an individual, the display of group normative behaviour 
is much less likely. Therefore, the SIDE model suggests that anonymity and immersion in a 
group can have one of two effects on behaviour: “it may either enhance or attenuate social 
identity as a function of the context in which it occurs” (Reicher et al., 1995, p. 178), which 
will result in behaviours which are related to personal standards rather than the norms of the 
social group.  
This idea of the salience of social identity being a key factor for determining behaviour is 
supported by several studies conducted by Reicher et al. (1995), which suggests that it could 
explain why anonymity doesn’t always have the same, predictable behavioural outcomes.  
Several studies have examined anonymity using the SIDE to explain behaviour. Postmes, 
Spears, Sakhel and de Groot (2001) conducted a study which examined whether anonymity 
promoted group normative behaviour in groups which had been primed for specific social 
behaviours. Postmes et al. (2001) found that anonymous groups displayed primed behaviours, 
whereas groups in which participants where made personally identifiable via digital pictures of 
themselves did not. This suggested that when participants are visually anonymous, they are 
more likely to behave according to social norms. Additionally, their study supported the 
suggestion that the effect of anonymity on behaviour was mediated by identification with the 
group. 
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Similarly, Chen and Wu (2015), conducted a study where they examined how anonymity 
facilitated cheating in online games. While cheating is seen as antinormative in most social 
situations, the authors suggest that it may actually be a normative behaviour within online 
gaming groups. Their study used the SIDE to interpret cheating behaviours which are so 
common online. They employed the use of a survey and focus groups which measured aspects 
such as gaming group identification, anonymity and cheating in games. They found that 
cheating in online games appeared to be normative in the gaming community. Regression 
analyses were conducted and the authors found that anonymity predicted cheating in games, 
and that group identification mediated the effect of anonymity on cheating. This supports the 
suggestion that ingroup identification, which is often used as a measure for salience of identity, 
could be a factor to consider when examining behaviours under conditions of anonymity.  
Chan (2010) applied the SIDE model in a field setting, where he used computer mediated 
communication in the form of email to put out a call to action (a request for donations), and 
surprisingly, he found that low identifying group members who were anonymous and had been 
primed for the salience of group identity, were more responsive to the experimental 
manipulations than high identifying group members.  In this study, those who were low 
identifiers were affected by the prime, and group salience became more important, leading 
them to respond affirmatively to the call to action.  
While anonymity is clearly an important aspect of social life, so is visibility to specific 
audiences. A great deal of our social life is spent with our personal identity being visible to 
those around us, subjecting our actions to scrutiny as we can be held personally accountable 
for them. Additionally, we may be visible to several different audiences depending on the 
context we find ourselves in. Klein et al. (2007) suggest that whom we are visible to is an 
important feature, as it will ultimately determine what strategies we employ with regard to 
behaviour – and whether our behaviours will be in line with in-group norms.  
Klein et al. (2007) term this strategic component of SIDE, identity performance and suggest 
that it pertains specifically to social identity. Identity performance refers to actions that an 
individual takes in order to represent themselves as a group member, and the actions that are 
taken are dependent on whatever social identity is salient at the time. Klein et al. (2007, p. 30), 
refer to “the purposeful expression (or suppression) of behaviours relevant to those norms 
conventionally associated with a salient social identity” – highlighting that identity 
performance can also refer to avoiding specific behaviours that could be considered anti-
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normative. The authors also suggest that identity performance is intentional – and does not 
include behaviours that are unconscious.  It is this strategic side of the SIDE that is creative, 
and norm producing. 
Identity performance has two main functions: identity consolidation (the securing of one’s 
social identity within the group) and identity mobilisation (using social identity to achieve some 
kind of collective action), and each of these are related to the audience one finds oneself visible 
to. Therefore, when it comes to being identifiable to an audience, the behaviours expressed in 
the presence of the out-group may not be the same as those expressed when personal identity 
is visible to the in-group. Rather, the way in which they are displayed depends on what the 
individual is attempting to convince the audience to believe about their social group. For 
example, a student may portray a hard-working and studious part of their social identity to 
academic staff (the outgroup), but to other students, may display other aspects of their student 
identity related to social life and interests outside of their academic endeavours. Therefore, the 
audience to whom one’s identity and behaviour are visible is crucially important in determining 
what actions are (or are not) taken. Additionally, identity performance in the within-group 
context may be different to that in the intergroup context. 
Klein et al. (2007) suggest that an important moderator of how identity performance occurs 
within an intergroup context (i.e. when an outgroup is also involved) is the legitimacy of the 
groups’ status within the social context. The legitimacy of group status has an impact on how 
individuals will enact identity performances to particular audiences. This in turn affects how 
norms evolve in the social situation, and whether this creates social change or maintains the 
social order.  
Group status and legitimacy 
According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), the legitimacy of the social status hierarchy is important 
when considering intergroup behaviour. Research has indicated that unstable and illegitimate 
inequality often gives rise to collective action by disadvantaged groups in order to improve 
their status position (Ellemers et al., 1993). This may result from the fact that the low-status 
group has suffered unfair treatment, and that the in-group could actually have favourable 
comparisons with the high-status out-group – however this potential isn’t reached due to the 
existing social structure. The unjust treatment of the low-status group may also increase levels 
of solidarity which contributes to the potential of collective action being undertaken. This 
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increased level of solidarity further contributes to the members of the low-status group having 
a stronger in-group identity.  
Therefore, it can be argued that group status affects the ways in which individuals will choose 
to behave, especially with regard to their identifiability to particular audiences. The reason that 
these behaviours are classified as identity performance, is that they are deliberate and 
strategically performed in order to achieve a particular goal within the intergroup context.  
Klein et al. (2007) similarly support the suggestion that differences in group status, as well as 
the legitimacy of the status differential, could have important effects when it comes to the 
identity performance associated with visibility to either in or out groups.  
Visibility to In-group and Out-group Audiences 
 
Klein et al. (2007, p. 40) argue that “perceived visibility to an audience is a condition of any 
form of identity performance.” They argue that the effects of visibility on behaviour also 
depend on several other variables, in complex relationships.  
An important aspect of being a group member is being recognized as such by other members 
of the group. Acceptance into a group helps to integrate an individual’s social identity into their 
self-concept. People often use self-presentations to establish positive interpersonal 
relationships with other individuals. The identity consolidation function refers to an 
individual’s attempts to gain acceptance to a group thereby consolidating their self-concept and 
membership within the group, and providing them with verification of their social identity 
(Klein et al., 2007). When an individual is visible to other ingroup members, they will be likely 
to behave in ways that make them seem as though they are prototypical members of the group, 
in order to gain acceptance and affirmation as a group member. 
Displaying normative group behaviour is a common way for individuals to gain better 
acceptance into the group (Noel, Wann & Branscombe, 1995). Jetten, Branscombe and Spears 
(2002) found that when an individual’s identity was insecure, and they were peripheral ingroup 
members, they were more likely to display ingroup favouritism than those who were on the 
peripheral, but had a secure social identity.  Similarly, Hohman, Gaffney and Hogg (2017) 
found that being self-uncertain about one’s belonging in the group, and being a peripheral 
member, resulted in higher ingroup bias. They suggest that being uncertain results from not 
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being prototypical, and so behaving in group normative ways allows for the individual to feel 
as though they belong better in the group.  
Showing ingroup prototypical behaviour serves to solidify or consolidate an individual’s social 
identity. Furthermore, the level of identification with a particular in-group is important in 
identity performance. Thus, it can be expected that when personally visible to an in-group 
audience, an individual is likely to behave according to group norms, for example by displaying 
in-group favouritism.  
But how does identifiability to the outgroup (without concurrent visibility to the ingroup) affect 
individual’s behaviour? Klein et al. (2007) suggest that identity performance when exposed to 
the outgroup depends on aspects such as the group status hierarchy, whether behaviours are 
deemed to be punishable or not, and whether there is the possibility of communication with 
other ingroup members. 
As an individual member of a group, expressing group normative behaviour in front of a 
powerful out-group can be risky when one is identifiable. If an individual behaves in a manner 
deemed unacceptable by the out-group, and is identifiable, they risk being punished. However, 
if behaviours are not punishable by the out-group, an individual may display them as an 
expression of their social identity. Therefore, it can be expected that when an individual is 
visible to the out-group, and there is a risk of sanction or punishment, the individual may 
behave according to out-group norms. 
Klein et al. (2007) argue that the existence of a group, as well as its social identity for group 
members, depends on how out-groups treat it. Sometimes, an in-group may undertake identity 
performance to try and change the out-groups perceptions about them or treatment of them. In 
contrast, Spears et al. (2001, in Klein et al., 2007) argue that when there is a high-status out-
group audience, the low-status in-group may display identity performance as an expression of 
resistance to the out-group, particularly when the social hierarchy is seen as illegitimate. By 
displaying in-group bias or in-group favouritism, a low-status group can demonstrate their 
resistance against the existing social order.  
When one considers visibility to an out-group, if other in-group members are not mutually 
visible, an individual may conform to the norms of the more powerful out-group. However, 
when in-group members are mutually visible, they are seen as a support system and in-group 
normative behaviour may occur (Reicher, Levine & Gordijn, 1998). Additionally, when one is 
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visible to only other outgroup members, it is possible that social identity may become less 
salient than personal identity, reducing ingroup normative behaviours and standards.  
For example, Reicher et al. (1998, Study 3) have used the SIDE model to examine how 
identifiability or visibility to the ingroup can affect participant’s behaviours, especially in 
relation to a dominant out group. The authors conducted a study to examine how visibility to 
an ingroup could affect participants willingness to display ingroup normative attitudes which 
were perceived as punishable by the outgroup. They found that students were more willing to 
show ingroup normative attitudes that were punishable by academic staff in a condition where 
they were visible to other students when completing the questionnaire in the presence of other 
students, than in the condition where they were isolated from other students.  
Reicher et al. (1998) suggest that the visibility of other ingroup members may increase the 
ingroups perceived power in relation to the outgroup, which affects the endorsement of ingroup 
normative attitudes, even in the presence of the dominant outgroup.  
Spears, Lea, Corneliussen, Postmes, & Ter Haar (2002) confirmed these findings. However, 
they went a step further and indicated that even when members of a less powerful in-group 
were not mutually visible, resistance to the out-group was increased when they were able to 
communicate with one another via computer-mediated communication. Therefore, both 
visibility to and communication with other in-group members appear to be important factors 
when resisting powerful out-groups in an attempt to change the social hierarchy.  
Visibility to the in-group audience allows for collective action to be seen as a pathway for 
resistance against powerful outgroups. This can be argued to be particularly relevant for groups 
who perceive their low-status to be illegitimate and may lead to an increase in displays of in-
group favouritism among in-group members (Ellemers et al., 1993). In-group favouritism in 
this sense allows the low-status group to compete with the high-status group. A large number 
of studies have focused on the use of in-group favouritism as a means of social competition. 
However, a lesser considered possibility is that low-status groups may display in-group 
favouritism in order to establish equality with the high-status group. Rubin, Badea and Jetten 
(2014) used the minimal group paradigm to investigate the intergroup behaviour in low-status 
groups. The results of these studies indicated that illegitimate low-status groups not only show 
“competitive favouritism” when participating in allocation in order to achieve positive 
distinctiveness, but also display “compensatory favouritism” in order to achieve intergroup 
fairness.  
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Another way in which groups may attempt to use identity performance to upgrade their relative 
social position, is by encouraging a lack of opposition from out-groups (Klein et al., 2007). 
Social change becomes much easier to attain with either collaboration with, or lack of 
opposition from the out-group. Individuals may therefore use identity performance to modify 
the perceptions of out-group members regarding the in-group. Klein et al. (2007, p. 38) argue 
that “downplaying some aspects of in-group identity may in these cases serve to gain the trust 
of the out-group.” Therefore, when identifiable to out-group members, it can be expected that 
an individual may refrain from displaying in-group promoting behaviours in order to make the 
out-group believe that it is not a group norm. 
With regard to the interaction of visibility and punishable behaviour, if in-group norms are 
likely to be seen as unacceptable and punishable by the out-group, and the individual is 
anonymous, they are more likely to display in-group normative behaviour due to the fact that 
they are not identifiable and therefore will not face sanctions from the out-group. For example, 
displays of in-group bias may be seen as unacceptable by the out-group, and result in some 
form of sanction for individuals who are visible to them.  
Similarly, out-group giving may be seen as unacceptable by the in-group, and if this behaviour 
is displayed while visible to the ingroup, it may result in ostracism or being shunned from the 
group. This highlights the effects that different audiences may have on the strategies which 
determine individual behaviour.  
If one considers the effect of the audience on behaviour, and the Marikana tragedy with regard 
to the actions of the police officers on that day, perhaps what is important to note is not the fact 
that officers were on camera footage and were thus identifiable, but rather to whom they are 
identifiable, and thus accountable to, in that moment. 
If the official account arguing that the police officers were acting in self-defence is to be 
believed, the audience to whom they were accountable was their fellow officers (or their in-
group), in the situation, in that particular moment in time. Their behaviour could be considered 
a collective, sanctioned response to an illegitimate threat. Furthermore, if one considers that 
group normative behaviour is usually followed in the presence of in-group members (Klein et 
al., 2007), when one officer fired a shot in self-defence, it is possible that other officers would 
come to see this behaviour as normative and would follow suit. 
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However, recently evidence has come to light which appears to contradict the official account 
of what happened during the massacre. The stories of survivors of the ordeal, as well as some 
damning video evidence shot during the massacre indicate that police seemed to have killed 
some of the striking miners in cold blood, without provocation (Crawford, 2016).  
Arguably, the SIDE model could still provide an explanation for such chilling events – if the 
shooting of the striking mine workers in order to end the strike had been planned, it is possible 
that the police officers involved behaved according to their salient social identity (being a 
police officer and upholding the law) and believed that the striking mine workers constituted a 
threat to their and others safety. After all, in the Marikana Commission of Inquiry’s report, it 
was indicated that there had been significant violence and aggression on the part of striking 
mine workers prior to the events of 16 August 2012 (Farlam, Hemraj & Tokota, 2015).  
Furthermore, the police officers may have only felt accountable and identifiable to a particular 
audience – their superiors who gave the orders to end the strike.  It is possible that at the scene 
where miners were allegedly shot in cold blood, external audiences such as the media and the 
public were not psychologically present for the officers at that moment in time, whereas their 
in-group was (i.e. other police officers, as well as their superiors within the South African 
Police Services). Psychological presence of a particular audience is a general condition for 
specific, strategic identity performance to take place, as is the belief that one is visible to the 
audience (Klein et al., 2007). It is even possible that the police officers did not think that their 
actions would ever be made visible to the public. 
On the basis of the SIDE it becomes clear that audiences, identifiability and anonymity are 
important considerations in understanding individual’s behaviour within intergroup situations.  
The SIDE indicates that human beings use identity performances in particular ways not only 
with regard to following normative behaviour, but also to create new norms within social 
contexts. This means that the strategic side of SIDE is not only concerned with norm following 
behaviour, but also with norm making behaviour, and these norms are what define the 
intergroup situation.  
The study of normative behaviour within and between groups has been an interest of social 
psychologists, and in-group favouritism has been extensively researched, particularly within 
minimal group situations. A classic example of studies conducted within a minimal group 
paradigm are those of Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament (1971), which examined the effects of 
social categorisation on intergroup behaviour. It was found that even in circumstances where 
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there was minimal in-group affiliation, no conflict of interests, and no previous hostility 
between groups, in-group favouritism existed.  Subjects mostly behaved in terms of their trivial 
in-group membership and due to group categorisations. This behaviour was more often in 
favour of the in-group, despite the fact that alternative, fairer and more economically 
advantageous options were available to them. In these minimal group studies, it appears that 
simple awareness of the existence of an out-group was enough to create in-group favouritism. 
This purely social psychological root of behaviour has however been contested, with theories 
that suggest that there is an alternative, strategic basis underlying such choices, which hinges 
on systems of generalized exchange within groups.  
Reputation as a mechanism for determining behaviour within groups 
Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) suggest that one of the important functions of social groups is 
that they can be used as a platform for generalised exchange or resource sharing amongst 
individuals who belong to them. Within social dilemmas or situations, there is often 
interdependence with other group members. Yamagishi, Jin and Miller (1998) argue that when 
individuals face a group situation, they are likely to follow particular norms or social rules with 
regard to decision making in terms of these systems of generalised exchange. The authors 
suggest that this behaviour is the result of a default assumption rather than a conscious strategy. 
This group heuristic acts as a behavioural guideline (or mental shortcut) for individuals to avoid 
being excluded from the group, and thus to be able to access shared resources.  
Should individuals ignore this group heuristic, and behave selfishly instead of sharing their 
resources with other in-group members, it is likely to be noticed and may lead to a risk of 
developing a bad reputation (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). Furthermore, it may even lead to a 
risk of being excluded from the group, preventing access to shared group resources. Therefore, 
Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) argue that to minimise the risk of being excluded from a group, 
or incurring a bad reputation among other in-group members, individuals are by default likely 
to behave in a cooperative or altruistic way toward the in-group. Even if there is only a very 
small risk of detection of selfish behaviour, individuals will still refrain from attempting to 
‘free-ride’ in the system of generalised exchange, for fear of exclusion. In conditions where 
individuals are anonymous and not identifiable to other ingroup members, it would be much 
more difficult for their ingroup members to hold them accountable for their behaviours and to 
exclude them from systems of exchange, based on their “bad reputation”. In such a situation, 
selfishness or non-altruistic behaviour is less risky, and even risk-free, so therefore presumably 
more likely to occur. Conversely, when individuals are identifiable to the in-group audience, 
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they are more likely to cooperate than to behave in a selfish manner. Cooperation with in-group 
members is referred to by the authors as an “ecologically rational strategy for those whose 
livelihood depends so much on generalised exchange” (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008, p. 8).  
Generalized exchange systems depend on expectations of reciprocity. Yamagishi and Kiyonari 
(2000) have indicated that reciprocity can be distinguished into two different categories – direct 
and indirect. A study was conducted where the results of a simultaneous one-shot Prisoners 
Dilemma (PD) game were compared with those of a sequential PD game, in order to determine 
whether expectations of in-group reciprocity could have had a causal effect on in-group 
favouritism, rather than it being caused by simply identifying with the in-group. It was 
hypothesised that in the simultaneous PD game, where participants were not aware of the 
choice of their partner, there would be increased reciprocity towards the in-group, based on 
expectations that other in-group members would cooperate. This expectation is based on the 
above-mentioned group heuristic (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). In contrast, in the sequential 
game, where the one player makes a choice, and only then does the second player – after 
knowing what the first’s choice is – make their play, it was hypothesised that the first player 
would be more likely to cooperate with the second player – regardless of that players group 
membership – due to the first player knowing that their choice may have an effect on the choice 
of the second player.   
The results of their experiment supported their hypotheses, and it was shown that in a 
simultaneous PD game, players showed more in-group favouritism, and there was an 
expectation of indirect reciprocity from other in-group members. In the sequential game, an 
expectation of direct reciprocity was apparent, and controlling for the effect of expectations of 
reciprocity reduced the effects of in-group identification on cooperation. 
Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) therefore suggest that common or unilateral knowledge of group 
membership also plays a role in behaviour. The authors suggest that in conditions where only 
one participant is aware of group membership – i.e. unilateral conditions – ingroup bias 
disappears because the participant can no longer expect that they will receive indirect benefits 
from their ingroup member, as there is no common knowledge of group membership. However, 
in conditions where group membership is common knowledge, and all participants are aware 
of their group members actually being part of the ingroup, ingroup bias is likely to occur based 
on expectations of indirect benefit.  
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While Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) suggest that reputational concerns may prevent 
individuals from behaving greedily due to fears of exclusion, no follow-up studies to date have 
attempted to examine whether personal identifiability or anonymity (in terms of being 
personally identifiable to others) within the ingroup could contribute to ingroup bias or greed. 
However, Mifune, Hashimoto and Yamagishi (2010) did conduct a study which examined the 
effects of an image of eyes on altruistic behaviour towards ingroup members. The authors 
suggested that exposure to an image of eyes caused participants to have higher public self-
awareness, as the image served as a cue to the presence of monitoring by the community. The 
study indicated that when exposed to an image of eyes, participants showed higher levels of 
altruism towards their ingroup members. Mifune et al. (2010) suggest that being monitored by 
community members causes participants to have concerns about their reputation, and so they 
are more likely to behave according to social norms. From this, it could be suggested that when 
participants are anonymous, their behaviour is not being monitored or specifically attributed to 
them – and so their concerns about reputation should be lessened.  
There have been several studies which have examined reputational concern with regard to 
behaviour. Nakai (2014) conducted a study which used agent-based evolutionary simulations 
for behaviour that demonstrated the emergence of ingroup favouritism, and the study indicated 
that reputation can affect how other ingroup members react to a player. In this study, reputation 
was operationalized by manipulating how cooperative or uncooperative an agent was within a 
group. Specifically, when players do not cooperate with the group, other group members stop 
cooperating with the defecting group member – and the author refers to this as the “in-groups’ 
revenge”. Nakai (2014) further suggests that reputation is something which is created and 
shared within the group context. From this we can expect that reputation is an important factor 
in determining behaviours in the group context.  
One study even compared reputation-based theories and social identity theory.  Romano, 
Balliet and Wu (2017) examined whether ingroup favouring behaviour was a result of high 
levels of social identification, or due to reputational concerns. They conducted 5 studies which 
examined whether cooperation was affected by cues of indirect benefits within the group 
context. Reputation was operationalized by making participants decisions private or public – 
where it was expected the cooperation would be more likely when decisions were public, than 
when they were private. The authors found that reputational concerns mediated ingroup 
favouritism, and more interestingly, found that reputation promoted cooperation with both 
ingroup and outgroup members, suggesting that the effect does not only occur for behaviour 
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within the ingroup. Additionally, the study found no support for the idea that social 
identification could be responsible for ingroup favouritism.  
In line with Yamagishi and Mifune’s (2008) argument that reputation is a major factor in social 
behaviour, De Cremer and Bakker (2003) argue that in social dilemmas, when an individual’s 
decisions or actions are public (not anonymous – the individual is identifiable and linked to 
their actions), the social consequences of such decisions are likely to influence the type of 
behaviour engaged in. When an individual’s actions are made accountable to them, “this 
accountability activates concerns about one’s reputation” (De Cremer & Bakker, 2003, p. 156). 
However, they suggest that accountability only influences decision-makers to the extent that 
they believe other group members are aware of the social norm of cooperation. What becomes 
important then, is what the norms of the audience they are accountable to are – i.e. is 
cooperation normative for the group in question. 
Therefore, it can be expected that when individuals know that their actions are being evaluated 
by others with whom they are interdependent, they are more likely to maintain cooperation due 
to feeling accountable for their actions. In contrast, when their actions are anonymous, it is 
possible that cooperation will decrease due to a lack of accountability and a lack of concern 
about reputation. Self-regulation of particular behaviours occurs as a function of the audience 
to whom one is identifiable and accountable. So, one can argue that when one is anonymous, 
the only audience one is accountable to is the self, and thus selfish behaviour may occur. 
However, there could be other explanations for selfishness according to deindividuation theory 
and the SIDE model. Deindividuation theory would argue that rather than reputation playing a 
role, anonymity could instead cause a loss of inhibition, leading to selfishness. This contrasts 
with the SIDE model, which suggests that anonymity can enhance the salience of social 
identity, making one behave according to group norms rather than individual norms – in this 
case, if selfishness becomes a group norm, group members will be more likely to act selfishly 
if they see other members doing so.  
Similarly, Tennie, Frith and Frith (2010) state that reputation is an important feature of gaining 
cooperation and thus reciprocation from others. They argue that when an audience is present, 
individuals are more likely to behave in a way that enhances their reputation, not only because 
there are observers present who judge their behaviour, but also because these observers may 
spread the news about an individual’s behaviour. In contrast, when no audience is present (or 
when individuals are anonymous), individuals are more likely to take part in ‘reputation-
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diminishing behaviour’ such as cheating, exploitation, or selfishness, as there is no risk of 
detection (Tennie et al., 2010). 
After reviewing deindividuation theory, the SIDE model and reputational theory focused on 
systems of generalized exchange, it becomes clear that the three theories provide contrasting 
explanations for certain behaviours. Below, I outline how these theories differ from one another 
in this regard. 
Contrasting theoretical explanations for behaviour under specific conditions of 
identifiability 
Deindividuation theory, the SIDE model and reputational theory provide differing theoretical 
accounts for individuals’ behaviour within the social context. Based on the literature, there is 
significant evidence which supports the theory that reputational concerns could be a mediator 
for ingroup cooperation and the adherence to group normative behaviour. However, there also 
appears to be some evidence for the theory that social identity could provide an explanation for 
behaviours such as ingroup favouritism and selfishness.  
If one considers Yamagishi and Mifune’s (2008) suggestion that within social groups there are 
systems of generalised exchange, it makes sense that groups can be seen as a vehicle for 
individual benefit in that participants are reliant on one another to be able to gain access to 
resources – and for this reason it is in their best interest to cooperate with other group members 
and uphold their good reputation if they want to be able to benefit. 
The SIDE model (Reicher et al., 1995) also provides a strong theoretical base for understanding 
decision-making in social situations. These decisions are very much dependent on the 
conditions which surround the social situation.  When faced with conflicting demands (for 
example, having the option to choose fairness versus in-group favouritism in a situation), 
individuals have to make careful decisions regarding what the best way forward would be, and 
they will do this according to whatever social identity is salient for them. It is in these types of 
situations that norms begin to emerge and evolve, and where the strategic side of identity 
performance comes into play.  
All three theories suggest that the state of identifiability (or anonymity) to an audience will 
have an impact on an individual’s actions, however the reasoning behind each theory regarding 
these behaviours differs. Each theory can be considered in terms of the state of identifiability, 
and the behaviour which could be observed within a state of identifiability. For example, an 
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individual may be anonymous, identifiable to either an ingroup or outgroup only, or completely 
visible to anyone in the social context. In each of these conditions, the individual would behave 
in specific ways. In some contexts, the behaviours which can be predicted by the theories may 
be the same, and in other contexts, the predicted behaviours will differ. However, even when 
the predicted behaviour is the same, the underlying explanation for it will differ according to 
which theory is applied.  
For example, when an individual is anonymous, both deindividuation theory and reputational 
theory suggest that an individual may behave in ways that would usually be deemed 
inappropriate, such as behaving selfishly. While deindividuation theory suggests this is due to 
the individual’s behaviour becoming disinhibited as a result of being anonymous, reputational 
theory would argue that it instead occurs as a result of the lack of concern for personal 
reputation, as the individual cannot be held to account for their behaviour. In contrast, the SIDE 
model suggests that anonymity can result in increased salience of social identity, and that group 
normative behaviour is more likely to occur. In this case, the behaviour which occurs would 
depend on group norms, and could range from ingroup favouritism to selfishness, depending 
on what norms evolve in the situation.  
When visible to the ingroup, both the SIDE model and reputational theory suggest that an 
individual will cooperate with other ingroup members. However, the two theories do not agree 
on the explanation for this behaviour. The question, then, could be posed as follows: Do 
participants cooperate with other ingroup members because their social identity is salient and 
it is normative for them to do so, or because they are concerned that their reputation is at stake? 
Arguably, if they are concerned with their reputation, it could be more about personal identity 
and not wanting to look bad because it would be personally damaging to them in terms of 
economic benefit. In contrast, if behaviour is due to a salient social identity, there is more 
concern about the standing of the group as a whole, because the social group contributes to the 
individual’s self-concept.  
For both the SIDE model and reputational theory, visibility to the outgroup would be expected 
to result in behaviours that may be less ingroup cooperative. From the perspective of the SIDE 
model, this would result in social identity becoming less salient, and personal identity driving 
behaviour instead. Alternatively, even if social identity is more salient, visibility to the 
outgroup could cause an individual to avoid displaying ingroup favouring behaviours in order 
to prevent the outgroup from competing with the ingroup. Reputational theory, in contrast, 
29 
 
would explain a lack of ingroup cooperation as being driven by a reduction in concern for one’s 
reputation. Instead, because the individual is visible to the outgroup, they are also accountable 
to the outgroup and so behaviour may actually cause individuals to cooperate with outgroup 
members instead. When an individual is visible to all others in a social context, reputational 
theory suggests that individuals will likely cooperate with all individuals in the exchange 
system, in order to maintain their reputations within and access to the system of exchange. 
According to deindividuation theory, if an individual is visible to others, their behaviour will 
become inhibited and controlled by their personal standards, resulting in behaviours that are 
considered appropriate. It could be expected, then, that individuals will cooperate with those 
who interact with them. From the perspective of the SIDE model, behaviour when visible to 
all others in the social context will depend on which is more salient at the time – social or 
personal identity. If social identity is highly salient, an individual will behave according to 
group norms, however if personal identity is highly salient, an individual will be more likely 
to behave according to personal standards. With whom one cooperates will therefore depend 
on whether social or personal identity is more salient.  
The SIDE model (Reicher et al., 1995) suggests that strategic side of identity performance is 
linked to the ways in which norms begin to evolve. Often, this strategic side is what spurs on 
the creation and emergence of new norms within a social situation, and rather than following 
existing rules or norms, individuals deliberately use different forms of identity performance 
during interaction to create new norms and persuade other members of their group to follow 
them.  In contrast, Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) suggest that behaviours are governed by 
concerns for an individual’s reputation, and that group members behave according to a group 
heuristic which ensures that they cooperate with other group members in order to avoid being 
excluded from generalized systems of exchange, which are inherent in all types of group 
interaction. In reputational theory, normative behaviour is perceived as static – group members 
behave according to a group heuristic in order to gain access to exchange systems. 
Contrastingly, the SIDE model treats normative behaviour as an evolving phenomenon.  
If one is able to put a system of exchange into place, it is possible to conduct an analysis of 
behaviour in various conditions of identifiability, making hypotheses based on the above 
theories. The Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL) – a software designed for experimental 
study of social interaction – provides an opportunity to study such systems of exchange. Using 
this platform, it is possible examine how players behaviour under specified conditions and what 
kinds of norms emerge. 
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The Virtual Interaction Application as an experimental platform for the study of 
norm emergence and the evolution of behaviour 
Due to the extensive research conducted using the minimal group paradigm, normative 
behaviour in minimal group situations is fairly well understood in the laboratory context. While 
the use of the traditional minimal group paradigm allows for the researcher to inhibit interaction 
and have more control over the variables, it doesn’t take the interactive nature of the intergroup 
situation into account. In reality, norms do not remain static and human beings do not exist in 
a social vacuum. Rather, norms change over time due to the interaction that takes place between 
individuals.  
Traditional minimal group paradigms do not allow for the phenomena that contribute to in-
group favouritism to be seen in their true interactive form. Fu et al. (2012, p. 1) argue that “the 
dynamic nature of bias results from complex social network interactions which play a central 
role in human societies” and that “the multi-faceted, dynamic and emergent nature of group 
identity is central to bias.” Therefore, it appears that an interaction itself can have significant 
effects on how phenomena evolve, and that if the interaction is repeated it may not produce the 
same result. 
The VIAPPL platform allows for the study of emergent norms and interactions as they evolve 
and emerge over the course of a game (Durrheim, Quayle, Tredoux, Titlestad & Tooke, 2016). 
Token allocation by participants over a series of rounds is used as a means by which norms 
evolving in interaction can be studied. The VIAPPL platform has been used to test levels of in-
group favouritism in both individual and group conditions. While the experimenters impose 
specific conditions in the first round of the game, whatever happens in subsequent rounds is 
completely determined by the participants in interaction with one another. This means that 
norms will not only change according to the inter-group situation, but also according to 
interactions that take place. The VIAPPL platform allows for the dynamic nature of intergroup 
relations to be studied in an experimental context.  
 
Durrheim et al. (2016) used the VIAPPL platform to conduct two studies which investigated 
ingroup favouritism and its evolution under a variety of conditions: including individuality 
versus groupness; equal status versus unequal status; and a no norm versus fairness versus 
competition condition. Based on social identity theory, Durrheim et al. (2016) hypothesized 
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that firstly, categorization of players into groups would promote group-based behaviours such 
as ingroup favouritism, and secondly, that implementing a social hierarchy based on unequal 
status relations between groups would result in low status group members partaking in ingroup 
favouring behaviours, whereas high status group members would partake in outgroup 
compensatory giving. The results from both studies that were conducted provided support for 
the hypotheses, and also indicated that the VIAPPL platform was successfully utilized to 
manipulate the experimental conditions and test the hypotheses.  
Due to the argument that identifiability to specific audiences has a significant effect on the 
ways in which individuals choose to behave, the VIAPPL platform makes it possible to 
experimentally test how different audiences may affect individual’s token allocation and the 
subsequent evolution of norms in the situation. By manipulating the participants’ identifiability 
to specific audiences in the game, it is possible to test the resulting change in their behaviours 
during interaction over time. By examining exactly which behaviours exist in actual 
interactions between participants, we can make extrapolations as to which psychological 
processes may be at play – those related to social identity or those related to reputational 
concern. The VIAPPL platform allows for the observation of how group norms become 
relevant and change over time, specifically with regard to the audience to whom one is 
identifiable and accountable.  
 
Aims and Rationale 
The aim of the following study was to examine whether participant behaviours (namely ingroup 
favouritism, self-giving and reciprocation) within a virtual, intergroup environment were 
affected by identifiability (anonymity versus being identifiable to various audiences) and status 
(being part of equal, high or low status groups). The following objectives were identified:  
1.  To determine whether anonymity results in participants partaking in self-giving behaviour, 
or contrastingly, in group normative behaviour, such as ingroup favouritism.   
2. To determine whether visibility to the ingroup results in participants partaking in ingroup 
favouring behaviour.  
3. To determine whether visibility to the outgroup results in lower levels of ingroup 
favouritism, and higher levels of direct reciprocation.  
4. To determine whether visibility to all players results in high levels of direct reciprocation, 
or high levels of ingroup favouritism.  
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5. To determine whether being visible to those with whom one has interacted with results in 
high levels of direct reciprocation.  
6. To examine whether being part of a low status group results in high levels of compensatory 
ingroup favouring behaviour. 
Hypotheses and expectations 
There are several hypotheses that can be made based on the three theoretical frameworks – 
namely traditional models of deindividuation, the SIDE model, and reputational theories – 
outlined in the literature review: 
H1: The SIDE model(Reicher et al., 1995), suggests that conditions of anonymity can 
either accentuate or attenuate group normative behaviours such as ingroup favouritism, 
such that anonymity may increase the salience of social identity and result in higher 
ingroup favouritism, or it may result in heightened personal identity which could result 
in behaviours related to personal standards rather than group norms. If social identity 
was salient, it would be expected that ingroup favouritism would increase when 
anonymous. Contrastingly, based on reputational theory, it can be hypothesized that 
when an individual is anonymous and cannot be held directly accountable for their 
actions, they may be more likely to behave in ways that would usually be deemed 
inappropriate in the group context – such as behaving selfishly. Similarly, 
deindividuation theory suggests that anonymity causes disinhibited behaviour, and so 
it could be expected that individuals will also be more likely to display selfishness in 
an anonymous state.  
H2: When visible to the in-group only, in-group favouritism will increase. In this 
instance, Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) suggest that when an individual is being 
monitored by other ingroup members, they are more likely to take note of the group 
heuristic and behave in an altruistic fashion towards in-group members in order to avoid 
being excluded due to uncooperative behaviour. This would also support the SIDE 
model (Reicher et al. 1995), as it suggests that identifiability to the in-group may lead 
to an increase in group-normative behaviour – in-group favouritism – due to the 
increased salience of ingroup social identity. 
H3: Based on Yamagishi and Mifune’s (2008) reputational theory, when visible to the 
out-group only, in-group favouritism should decrease. This is because the individual is 
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not identifiable to their in-group, there is no risk of detection or exclusion when they 
do not behave altruistically toward their in-group. This would also support the SIDE 
(Reicher et al., 1995) as when identifiable to the out-group, the individual may wish to 
downplay any expectations for in-group favouritism in order to prevent the out-group 
from thinking it is taking place. This may prevent the out-group from competing with 
the in-group. It is also possible that being visible to only outgroup members would 
result in personal identity becoming more salient, highlighting the fact that one is 
visible as an outgroup individual rather than an ingroup member – increasing the 
perception of commonalities with individual members of the outgroup. This would 
result in allocations being made based on personal preferences rather than group norms. 
Additionally, direct exchange may occur as the game progresses (Yamagishi and 
Kiyonari, 2002), thus a norm of reciprocation could emerge for players who are visible 
to the outgroup. As the VIAPPL platform is not a “one-shot” type of software, an 
experiment is conducted over a series of several rounds. Therefore, participants are 
aware that their decisions and behaviours can affect those of other participants.  This 
may result in a reduction of in-group favouritism when only visible to the out-group, 
due to participants having an expectation of direct exchange with the participants that 
they are visible to, rather than generalised exchange, as they are not identifiable nor 
accountable to their own in-group. 
H4: Deindividuation theory suggests that being personally visible to others (i.e. both the 
ingroup and the outgroup) results in individuals inhibiting their behaviour and acting in 
socially acceptable ways, and it could be expected that if deindividuation theory were 
supported, participants in this condition would show direct reciprocation with those 
they received tokens from. When visible to both in-group and out-group, the SIDE 
model suggests that behaviour will depend on whether personal or social identity is 
more salient. If social identity is more salient, a participant will be likely to behave in 
group normative ways, and show higher ingroup favouritism. If personal identity is 
more salient, behaviour will be less likely to be group normative, and ingroup 
favouritism would decrease. According to the reputational theory (Yamagishi and 
Mifune, 2008), participants in this condition will be more likely to indirectly reciprocate 
with all other participants in order to avoid being excluded from the system of 
exchange. In this case, we would expect that there would be a reduction in group 
favouritism due to the system of exchange including both in and outgroups.  
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H5: When visible only to individuals one receives from and gives to, participants will 
be more likely to directly reciprocate. When involved in a system of generalised 
exchange (Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008), to avoid being excluded and to gain access 
to shared resources, one must cooperate and behave altruistically towards other 
members of the system. Therefore participants are more likely to behave altruistically 
towards and cooperate with those whom they receive tokens from. In this condition, 
direct exchange will be more likely to occur.  
H6: When belonging to a group that is less powerful, and where the inequality is 
perceived as illegitimate, participants are more likely to display in-group favouritism. 
In order to change the illegitimate power hierarchy, a weaker group must express 
resistance to a more powerful group, and one way of doing this is by members uniting 
in order empower the group as a whole. 
H7: The SIDE model suggests that normative behaviour emerges over time as 
individuals make decisions about how to behave. It can be expected that ingroup 
favouritism, self-giving and reciprocation will emerge and change over time.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Experimental platform: The Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL) 
The Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL) platform is an experimental software that allows 
for the observation of social interaction as it takes place within a game-like environment 
(Durrheim et al., 2016). This platform allows researchers to manipulate the social conditions 
surrounding interaction, and in turn evolving norms, networks and social identities can be 
observed in action.  
Participants are represented as avatars on the screen, and interact by allocating tokens to one 
another over a series of rounds, situated within a single game. Researchers are able to 
manipulate key variables such as whether participants are playing as individuals or as members 
of a group, the number of groups involved in the interaction, the size of groups, and starting 
token balances of groups.  
Additionally, researchers are able to manipulate features of the social environment, such as 
legitimacy of status and the meaning of exchanges (e.g. tokens representing money). This 
allows for full manipulation of the social context in which exchanges will take place, and allows 
researchers to observe how norms evolve under specific conditions. 
Research Design 
 
Experimental design and behavioural measurement 
The present study employed a quantitative experimental design, involving both within and 
between-subjects factors. This type of design allows for the objective observation of 
individual’s behaviour as it takes place in the experimental intergroup context. 
The within-subjects factor was time. There were (n=40) rounds of token allocations (tokens 
were monetary) nested in the game. This allowed for the observation of behavioural changes 
in the game over time.  
There were two between-groups factors. The first factor was status which involved 
manipulating the levels of equality and inequality among the groups by varying the token 
balances of groups. This independent variable had three levels: equal status, high-status and 
low-status. In equal status conditions, participants all began the game with twenty tokens. In 
the inequality status conditions, high-status participants began the game with thirty tokens, and 
low-status participants began the game with ten tokens. Inequality was illegitimate, and was 
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manipulated by randomly assigning participants to two groups, with one group receiving more 
tokens than the other. Participants were randomly assigned to a group by the software. 
However, to manipulate the perceived legitimacy of their status, participants were asked to 
complete a dot estimation task (see Appendix 1) and were informed that they had been placed 
in a group with players who had similar estimates to their own. Due to there being no reason 
for one group receiving more tokens, it was expected that participants would perceive the status 
situation to be illegitimate or unfair. 
The second factor, the identifiability of participants to both in- and out-group members was 
also manipulated. Identifiability of participants was achieved by taking webcam photographs 
of them prior to the start of their participation. These photographs were used as their avatars 
when their identifiability was manipulated.  
Participants were required to take a webcam photograph after registering and logging into the 
experiment. The webcam was fixed on the screen of the computer, and aimed at the participants 
face. The photograph capability was built into the software for the game (see figure 1), and 
participants were required to take and approve their photograph before being able to begin the 
game. Players were always able to see their own photograph as their avatar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Webcam photographs were taken and used as avatars. This functionality was 
built into the VIAPPL software.  
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There were six levels of identifiability. 
1) Anonymity (see figure 2) – participants were only visible to themselves on the screen. 
In this condition, participants avatars stayed fixed in one place on the screen throughout 
the game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Anonymity condition – visible only to oneself 
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2) Complete anonymity (see figure 3) – in this condition, participant’s avatars were also 
only visible to themselves. However, unlike the anonymity condition, in each round, 
the participant’s avatar moved to a different position on the screen. This meant that 
there was complete anonymity, as one would not be able to work out who had moved 
where on the screen.  
 
Figure 3: Complete Anonymity Condition – note the change of geographical position in 
the arena between round 1 and round 2 
 
3) Visibility to in-group only (see figure 4) – participant’s avatars were only visible or 
identifiable to themselves and members of their in-group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Visible to the ingroup  
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4) Visibility to out-group only (see figure 5) – participant’s avatars were only visible or 
identifiable to themselves and members of the out-group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Visible to the outgroup 
 
5) Visibility to both ingroup and outgroup (see figure 6) – participants avatars were visible 
to themselves and members of both in- and out-groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Visible to all players 
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6) Visibility to ties (see figure 7) – only visible to individuals from whom participants 
receive tokens and those who they give tokens to. 
 
Figure 7: Visible to ties – note that after submitting their allocation, the player is able to 
see those they received from and gave to on a review screen for the previous round. 
Sampling 
The sample consisted of n = 480 participants. Participants’ ranged in age from 18 years old to 
38 years old. The mean age of participants was M= 21.33 (SD = 2.79). Of these, n = 302 were 
female participants (62.9%) and n = 176 (36.7%) were male participants. Of the total number 
of participants, n =458 (95.4%) were Black, n = 10 (2.1%) were Coloured, n = 8 (1.7%) were 
Indian and n = 2 (0.4%) were White. Missing demographic data was noted for two of the 480 
participants. These two cases were dropped from the analysis for demographic information.  
 
The chosen sampling method was a non-probability, convenience sample. This was due the 
large population of students available, as well as the main aim of this study not being 
generalisability, but rather the observation of consistency in behaviour of the participants when 
placed under specific experimental conditions within the game. 
 
Psychometric measurement 
Demographic data were obtained through the use of LimeSurvey, which is an online tool for 
conducting surveys. The VIAPPL software allows for LimeSurvey questionnaires to be 
integrated into specific parts of a game. LimeSurvey is used to obtain demographic information 
and to conduct manipulation checks. The only manipulation check which was included 
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determined whether participants had been successfully placed into the two different groups. A 
binomial test was conducted on the manipulation check for group belonging. In the first group 
(purple), 100% (240 of 240) of the participants answered correctly and in the second group, 
98% (236 of 240) of the participants answered correctly. 
 
Variables 
The independent variables were thus: 
• Group status - consisting of three levels: equal, high and low-status. 
• Identifiability – consisting of six conditions: Complete anonymity, anonymity, visible 
to ingroup, visible to outgroup, visible to ties, and visible to all.  
• Time 
 
Time  
As time consisted of 40 rounds of play, it would be difficult to use in in its original form for 
comparative purposes, due to the very large number of fixed effects this would create in the 
models. For this reason, the time variable was grouped into several waves, which each 
consisted of a number of rounds. The waves were then used for comparative purposes. The 
models for ingroup favouritism and reciprocation treated time as a factor with 5 waves (levels), 
each of which included 8 rounds of play.  
Due to the extensive zero-inflation and increase of self-giving over time, the self-giving models 
treated time as a factor which included 4 waves (levels), each of which consisting of 10 rounds. 
This was done to further decrease the number of fixed effects for the models, in order to ensure 
the models would converge.  
 
The dependent variables were: 
Ingroup favouritism 
Ingroup favouritism was modelled using the nlme and lme4 packages in R. Ingroup favouritism 
could be best described as a group-favouring strategy. Ingroup favouritism was operationalised 
by using the proportion of tokens given to the ingroup over the sum of tokens given to both 
ingroup and outgroup:  
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Ingroup favouritism = 
𝐼𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝐼𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔+𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
 
This allowed for the ratio of ingroup giving to be compared to the sum of giving to both groups. 
This ratio could then be examined to see if it increased or decreased over time across 
experimental conditions. Ingroup, outgroup and self-giving were count variables which could 
each range from 0 to 8 (and jointly summed up to 8) in each wave. 
Self-giving  
Self-giving was collected as a separate variable from ingroup giving and was modelled using 
the lme4 package in R. Self-giving could be best described as a self-favouring strategy. Self-
giving was operationalised by determining the proportion of the number of tokens allocated to 
self over 4 experimental time waves – each of which included 10 rounds of play. 
Self-giving = 
𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 (10)
 
Therefore, the total proportion of self-giving over each wave could be examined, and the 
proportions compared to see if there was an increase or decrease over time across the 
experimental conditions.  
Reciprocation 
Reciprocation could be best described as an exchange favouring strategy. To model 
reciprocation, a binary variable was created where if a participant received a token from the 
person whom they gave a token to in the previous round, reciprocation would be a 1, and if 
not, it would be a zero. In order to do this, the data was lagged. A generalised linear mixed-
effects model was run via the glmer() function with a binomial distribution for these data. The 
residuals from the model were difficult to interpret. For this reason, the DHARMa package in 
R was used to assess model fit. The DHARMa package produces a quantile to quantile plot in 
order to detect overall deviations from the expected distribution, as well as a plot of the 
residuals against predicted values (Hartig, 2017). The scaled residual plots which were 
produced by the DHARMa package, based on the glmer() model showed that the model fitted 
the data well (Figure 8). 
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 Figure 8: DHARMa scaled residual plot of reciprocation model using glmer() 
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Creating variables for ingroup favouritism, self-giving and reciprocation allowed for the 
operationalisation of the behaviours which could be expected from the different conditions of 
identifiability, based on deindividuation theory, the SIDE model and reputational theory.  
Table 1 : Research Design 
Conditions of 
identifiability 
No. of replications 
Equality Illegitimate 
Inequality 
Total replications per 
identifiability 
condition 
Anonymity k=5 k=5 k=10 
Complete 
Anonymity 
k=5 k=5 k=10 
Identifiable to In-
group only 
k=5 k=5 k=10 
Identifiable to Out-
group only 
k=5 k=5 k=10 
Identifiable to both 
in- and out-group 
k=5 k=5 k=10 
Identifiable to Pt. 
received tokens from 
and given tokens to 
k=5 k=5 k=10 
 
In total, sixty experimental games were conducted (ten games per identifiability condition, of 
which five had an equal status condition, and five had an unequal status condition) and eight 
participants were included in each experimental game (see Table 1).  
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In addition, the two experimental constants which were visible to all participants for the 
duration of the game were also included in the design. These were: 
• token balances (delineating the number of token players accrue in each round) and 
• ties between participants (which form as a result of token exchanges between them).  
 
 
Ethical considerations in sampling and data collection: 
Full ethical approval was granted by the UKZN Humanities and Social Sciences Research 
Ethics Committee for this study (Appendix 1). The sample did not include special or vulnerable 
participants. All participants were over the age of eighteen years. Participants were recruited 
through the use of an advert (Appendix 2), stating that we are conducting a study on virtual 
interaction and intergroup behaviour, as well as in person by the experimenters and research 
assistants.  
All participants were given an information letter (Appendix 3) and were encouraged to ask 
questions if they experienced any misunderstanding. Additionally, participants were asked to 
sign an informed consent form (Appendix 4), stipulating that they understood that participation 
was voluntary as well as confidential, and that they were able to withdraw from the study at 
any point.  
While participants were required to scan their fingerprint to take part in the study, this was only 
done in order to prevent them from participating in more than one game, and did not link their 
behavioural data to any personal information, such as their name or student number. 
Additionally, in order to log into the game, participants had to register a VIAPPL account 
which required their email address and name. However, this information was in no way tied to 
their game data. LimeSurvey data was anonymous.   
Participants were given a small cash payment as an incentive and/or partial compensation for 
their time, expenses accrued and effort involved in taking part in the study. Incentives were 
used to make the games a realistic competition for resources. Each token in the game was 
valued at R1, enforcing the illegitimate inequality of the starting token balances. Each 
participant received an incentive that coincided with their final token balance, plus a bonus 
ZAR10.00. The average cash incentive was ZAR30.00 per participant. 
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The experimental study involved some low risk deception. Participants were told that they were 
assigned to their group based on them being over estimators or under estimators in a dot 
estimation task, however in reality they were randomly assigned to their groups. This low risk 
form of deception was warranted in this study as the research explored the effects of group 
membership and identifiability to in- and out-groups on individuals’ behaviour using the 
minimal groups created in the experimental setting. 
Participants were debriefed after their participation in order to minimize any potential stress or 
harm.  Participants were debriefed by informing them that their assignment to a group was 
allocated randomly (see experimental procedure – Appendix 5). 
The VIAPPL data from the games were stored on the main server in the Psychology 
Laboratory, and the demographic data were collected through LimeSurvey, with the data stored 
on the Psychology Laboratory’s administration profile which is not accessible to any third 
party. The Psychology Laboratory requires an alarm code and key to gain access to the room. 
Furthermore, the LimeSurvey profile requires the use of a username and password in order to 
gain access; these are not freely available to third parties, and are only know to experimenters. 
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Data analysis 
Token exchanges made during each trial situated within each game were recorded by the 
VIAPPL software. Trial one was used to familiarise participants with how the game worked 
and to allow them to practice allocating tokens. The analysis used the data from trial two, which 
consisted of forty rounds of play. 
The VIAPPL software allows for the exportation of the game data to Microsoft Excel format. 
These sheets were then read into the statistical program R. Due to the complex nature of the 
game data (participants’ interactions over time, over a number of rounds and games with 
specific conditions) multilevel modelling was the chosen method for analysis.  
Reliability, validity and generalisability 
The results from the studies conducted by Durrheim et al. (2016), indicate that the VIAPPL 
game environment provides a successful experimental platform in which to conduct 
experiments of this nature, where consistency in behaviour was observed amongst players. The 
VIAPPL platform allows for the evolution of behaviour as interactions take place over time, 
i.e. over the 40 rounds of play. For this reason, reliability in terms of repeatability in its 
traditional form is not expected, but one can expect consistency in behaviour between similar 
conditions.  
The internal validity of experiments conducted using the VIAPPL platform is reasonably high, 
due to the studies being conducted using a controlled experimental approach. This 
methodology reduces the possibility of confounding factors having an effect on results. For 
this study, these controls included measures such as random allocation of participants to 
computers, and therefore groups within the game; a strictly controlled environment where 
participants could not talk or communicate; the use of a fingerprint scanner to prevent 
participants from partaking more than once; and the use of an experimental procedure and 
script, to ensure little to no experimenter effects could occur.  
The aim of this study was not to produce generalisability in the traditional sense (i.e. to a 
broader population), but rather to examine basic intergroup behaviours in a virtual, minimal 
group environment. Because this study only included students at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal, the results cannot be generalized to the broader population, but may be indicative of 
social norms at the local, or specific group level.  
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Multilevel modelling 
Multilevel modelling allows for the variability between different layers of data to be taken into 
account (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). It is often used to analyse clustered (grouped) or repeated 
measures data (Buxton, 2008). For clustered data, there are often various contextual factors 
that may affect a measurement, for example, when conducting analyses on school children, 
their results could be affected by the class, school or region they are in. Failing to take these 
clustered variables into account could result in unrealistic results. Similarly, in repeated 
measures data, each measurement is not independent of the measures that came before it, for 
each individual. Multilevel modelling takes this lack of independence of measures into account, 
by including the nested nature of data in the structure of the model (Paranjothy & Thomas, 
2000). Multilevel models allow for the inclusion of both random and fixed effects, whereas 
regression models only allow for the inclusion of fixed effects. 
The VIAPPL data structure is a nested design, and multilevel modelling was found to be an 
appropriate method of analysis. VIAPPL data is nested due to individual responses being 
nested in rounds, which were nested in games with specific conditions attached to them. 
Multilevel modelling also allowed for the study of how behaviours emerged over time, by 
allowing time to be included as a random effect. 
Behavioural analysis 
Behavioural analysis of the VIAPPL data was conducted in order to determine levels of ingroup 
favouritism and self-giving, and how these emerged over time based on different conditions 
within the game. The data were analysed using various packages in R. 
Three different models were used to analyse ingroup favouritism, self-giving and reciprocation 
respectively.  
Modelling 
Ingroup favouritism 
A hierarchical linear model was used for modelling ingroup favouritism, in order to take the 
unexplained variation between groups and individuals, and the fact that these vary in different 
ways into account (Snjiders & Bosker, 1999). In order to include this variation, both random 
intercepts and random slopes were included in the model. 
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Modelling of ingroup favouritism was achieved using the lme() function in R, which fits a 
linear mixed effects model to the data. This function allows for nested random effects (such as 
the random intercepts and slopes mentioned above) to be included in the model. The function 
also allows the analysis to take autoregressive data into account, where past values can have 
an effect on current values (as in the experiments included in this work, which included 
repeated measures, where previous rounds affected the output values for future rounds).  
The linear mixed effects model was run with the following predictors:  
Time (5) x Status (3) x Identifiability(6) 
The model was run in order to determine main effects and to test interactions. Following this, 
tests for autocorrelation were conducted. The model was tested for the effects of random 
intercepts and random slopes, which were then included in the model. In addition, and AR1 
correlation structure was applied to the model due to the autoregressive nature of the data – 
this improved the fit of the model.  
Post hoc analyses were carried out using the emmeans and multcomp packages in R, to 
calculate estimated marginal means for each condition, and make multiple comparisons using 
Tukey’s D.  
Self-giving 
An examination of the distributions for the self-giving data across the design indicated that the 
distribution was skewed and the data were extensively zero inflated with very little to no self-
giving at the start of each condition, with this behaviour increasing over time (see Appendix 
16). For this reason, it was decided to fit a linear mixed-effects model to the data using the 
lmer() function from the LME4 package. This allows for the inclusion of random effects. In 
order to deal with the violation of normality due to zero-inflation, the bootstrapping method 
was used as it does not rely on the assumption of normality in order to make inferences. 
Bootstrapping refers to a technique in which data is randomly resampled with replacement in 
order to create a number of resampled datasets (James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2013). 
From these resampled datasets, new confidence intervals can be computed.   
The dependent variable for the model was Tokens to Self. The models were run with the 
following predictors:  
4 (Time) x 3 (Status) x 6 (Identifiability) 
50 
 
Post hoc analyses of the self-giving models were run using lsmeans() from the lmerTest 
package in R, using Tukey’s D. This allowed for the comparison of estimated marginal means.  
Reciprocation 
Reciprocation was operationalised by creating a binary variable which counted as 1 if 
reciprocation occurred, and 0 if it did not. This was achieved using a lag function in R. 
Following this, reciprocation was modelled as a binary independent variable using a 
generalised linear mixed effects model in R, with a full nesting structure of participants nested 
in games.  
Packages used in R 
Various packages were installed and loaded into R in order to conduct the analyses. The 
following packages were used (The Comprehensive R Archive Network): 
ggplot2 
The statistical package ggplot2 is designed to provide the user with a means with which to 
create statistical graphics or plots, which can be layered, starting with raw data and building up 
layers of annotations and summaries (Wickham, 2009). It uses a grammar based on the 
Grammar of Graphics, which allows components to be composed in many different ways.  This 
allows one to tailor graphics to be specific to your problem. 
descr 
The descr package in R is used to compute descriptive statistics for categorical variables. 
vcd 
The vcd package in R is used to visualise categorical data.  
tidyr 
tidyr is a package in R used to “tidy” data so that it is easier to work with, by ensuring that each 
column is a variable and each row can be treated as an observation.  
dplyr 
The dplyr package in R is used for manipulating data. 
magrittr 
The magrittr package in R is used to reduce development time of code, as well as to improve 
the codes readability and maintenance.  
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xtable 
The xtable package in R allows the user to make tables out of R output.  
simsalapar 
The simsalapar package in R is used for running and analysing simulation studies. 
readxl 
The readxl package in R allows for the easy importation and exportation of excel files into and 
out of R. 
tools 
The tools package in R allows the user to manipulate R packages and their documentation 
lubridate 
The lubridate package in R allows the user to work with dates and times in R. 
stringr 
The stringr package in R allows the user to manipulate characters in strings. 
moments 
The moments package in R provides a variety of ways to calculate skewness and kurtosis. 
nlme 
The nlme package in R is used to fit linear and non-linear mixed effects models.  
lme4 
The lme4 package in R is used to fit linear and generalised linear mixed effects models. 
effects 
The effects package in R allows the user to display effects in graph and tabular format. 
car 
The car package in R is used for regression analysis.  
DHARMa 
The DHARMa package in R allows for the easy interpretation of residuals coming from general 
linear mixed models (Hartig, 2017a). 
emmeans 
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The emmeans package in R is used to calculate estimated marginal means for various kinds of 
models. 
multcomp 
The multcomp package allows for simultaneous inference in parametric models.  
lsmeans 
The lsmeans package in R allows for the calculation of least-squares means, contrasts and 
comparisons of slopes.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Ingroup, outgroup and self-giving across the full 
experimental design 
Descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations and skewness) were calculated for ingroup 
giving, outgroup giving, and self-giving across the full design.  The means for ingroup, 
outgroup and self-giving refer to the average number of times tokens were allocated to the 
target group over the eight rounds in each experimental time wave. Following this, means were 
plotted graphically to illustrate the changes in ingroup, outgroup and self-giving over the five 
experimental waves, for each crossed condition in the full design (Figure 9).  
Across the design, mean ingroup giving in the first experimental wave is higher than both 
outgroup giving and self-giving. The only exceptions to this are for the high-status group when 
visible to all players (Ingroup giving – M = 3.550, SD = 2.139), and when visible to the 
outgroup (Ingroup giving – M = 3.850, SD = 1.899). In these conditions’ outgroup giving 
begins at a higher point than ingroup giving and self-giving. The other exception is for the low-
status group, when visible to the outgroup (Ingroup giving – M =3.900, SD = 2.024). In these 
conditions’, outgroup giving and ingroup giving appear to begin at more or less equal levels. 
Self-giving begins at lower point than both ingroup and outgroup giving across all conditions 
in the design.  
Ingroup giving decreases over time (between wave one and wave five) across all equal status 
and high-status group conditions. However, in the low-status group condition, when visible to 
the outgroup, ingroup giving increases between the first (M =3.900, SD = 2.024) and the fifth 
wave (M = 4.900, SD = 1.832). In all other low-status conditions, ingroup giving decreases 
over time. Outgroup giving decreases over time across all conditions, with the exception of the 
high-status group when anonymous, where it increases slightly between the first (M = 3.400, 
SD = 1.698) and the fifth wave (M = 3.850, SD = 2.681). Self-giving increases over time in all 
conditions, ending at higher level by the end of the fifth wave.  
Ingroup, outgroup and self-giving across the full design were used to calculate mean ingroup 
favouritism and self-giving, the dependent variables used in the models. The methods used to 
calculate these variables were discussed in chapter 3. 
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Figure 9: Descriptive plot of mean ingroup, outgroup and self-giving over five 
experimental time waves  
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval around the mean.
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Ingroup favouritism 
The methodology for modelling was discussed in Chapter 3. Below, the steps taken during the 
modelling process are outlined, with results and statistics discussed accordingly. The data 
structure was round/time (Level 1), nested in game (Level 2), in participant (Level 3). 
According to the intra-class correlation, 50% of the unexplained variance exists at the round 
level, 37% of the unexplained variance existed at the participant level, and 13% of the 
unexplained variance exists at the game level. The initial step in modelling involved 
determining whether random terms were needed. This meant comparing a linear model that 
excluded random effects with a linear model with a random factor. Including random intercepts 
significantly improved the fit of the initial model (AICnull=762.616). The first step in this 
process involved including only games as a random factor (AIC=485.803; L-Ratio=278.814, 
df=3, p < 0.0001), and after this included both games and individuals as random factors (AIC=-
368.847; L-Ratio=1135.463, df=4, p < 0.0001). 
Next, the fixed effects (time, status and identifiability) were added to the model, first with 
random intercepts only (AIC=-381.909), and then with random intercepts and random slopes 
(AIC=-1080.06), which improved fit (L-Ratio=706.152, df=16, p<0.0001). The inclusion of 
random intercepts and slopes helps to take into account any variability that exists between and 
within different layers of data (Snjiders & Bosker, 1999). Based on the improved fit of the 
model, the nested effects (individuals, time and games) were included in the analysis, which 
meant the random effects for intercept and slope terms were estimated. Next an AR1 correlation 
structure was applied to the model (with the 3 fixed effects) to take autocorrelation into account 
and see if it would improve fit. As the data consisted of repeated measures, it was 
autoregressive in nature and past rounds had an effect on future rounds. The AR1 correction 
improved model fit (L-Ratio = 8.595, df = 17, p = 0.0034). The residuals were approximately 
normally distributed with the full nesting structure in place. 
The model was first tested for interactions and then main effects. The 3-way interaction (AIC 
= 203.014, LogLik = -57.507) between time, status and identifiability was not significant 2(10, 
n = 480) = 6.045, p = 0.81, however both status 2(2, n = 480) = 15.1975, p = 0.0005 and 
identifiability 2(10, n = 480) = 26.341, p = 7.663e-05 had significant main effects, with time 
not being significant 2(1, n = 480) = 1.478, p = 0.2240. For this reason, the 3-way interaction 
was dropped from the analysis, and instead 2-way interactions were included.   
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The 2-way interaction between time and status (AIC = 42.445, LogLik = -7.223) was not 
significant 2(2, n =480) = 1.010, p = 0.6035, but status had a significant main effect in this 
model 2(2, n = 480) = 12.7, p = 0.0017. Similarly, the two-way interaction between time and 
identifiability (AIC = 72.884, LogLik = -16.442) was not significant 2(5, n = 480) = 5.317,  p 
= 0.3784, however identifiability had a main effect on this model 2(5, n= 480) = 23.113, p = 
0.0003.  
Next, the interaction between identifiability and status – the two significant main effects – was 
tested. Again, the interaction was not found to be significant 2(10, n = 480) = 8.683, p= 0.5624 
(AIC = 72.595, LogLik = -10.297), and both identifiability 2(5, n = 480) = 26.340, p = 7.665e-
05 and status 2(2, n = 480) = 15.218, p = 0.0005 were found to have significant main effects.  
Based on the above, the final model selected included identifiability 2(5, n = 480) = 27.475, 
p =4.61e-05 and status 2(2, n = 480) = 15.330, p = 0.0005 as two main effects, with no 
interactions (AIC = 26.986, LogLik = 2.507). Restricted maximum likelihood algorithms 
(REML), were used to obtain estimates of AIC and Log Likelihood, however full maximum 
likelihood (ML) was used for model comparisons. The results for the model for ingroup 
favouritism can be found in Table 2.  
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Table 2 : Results for Identifiability and Status as Main Effects on Ingroup Favouritism 
 
Fixed Effects Model coefficients 
Source 2 Df p < Source B SD T-value P-value 
Identifiability 27.475 5 0.0001 Intercept 0.55 0.03 18.00 0.0000 
Status 15.330 2 0.0005 Equality: high vs equal -0.10 0.03  -3.89 0.0001 
 
Equality: low vs equal -0.04 0.03 -1.68 0.0932 
Random Effects 
 
Identifiability: 
complete anon vs all 
0.16  0.04 3.89 0.0003 
Source Int. (SD) Slope. (SD) R Identifiability: anon vs 
all 
0.14 0.04 3.38 0.0013 
Time|Game 0.040 0.028 -0.266 Identifiability: 
Ingroup vs all 
0.12 0.04 3.06 0.0034 
Time|Game|Particip 0.159 0.041 -0.252 Identifiability: 
Outgroup vs all 
0.01 0.04 0.22 0.8249 
Residual 0.202 
  
Identifiability: 
Tied vs all 
0.09 0.04 2.32 0.0240 
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Identifiability as a main effect on ingroup favouritism 
Results of the model for ingroup favouritism can be found in Table 2. The descriptive statistics 
for identifiability as a main effect on ingroup favouritism can be found in Appendix 7. Figure 
10 depicts the differences in mean ingroup favouritism between the identifiability conditions, 
as well as error bars for each condition, which represent 95% confidence intervals. 95% 
confidence intervals for each condition of identifiability can be found in Appendix 8. The 
confidence intervals for each condition provide the range of values for mean ingroup 
favouritism which are plausible to occur in the wider population. Standardized fixed effects 
were calculated for the identifiability conditions using the fixef() function in R, which extracts 
fixed effect sizes for the model. Fixed effect sizes can be found in Appendix 9.  
Visibility to all players was the reference category for comparison. Visibility to the out-group 
(M = 0.564, SD = 0.272) was the only identifiability condition that was not significantly 
different B= 0.009, SD= 0.040, t(54) = 0.222, 95% CI[-0.071,  0.089], p = 0.8249 from the 
reference category. Complete anonymity (M =0.678, SD = 0.321) appeared to have the largest 
difference B = 0.156, SD = 0.040, t(54) = 3.888, 95% CI[0.076, 0.236], p = 0.0003 when 
compared with the group where players were visible to all participants (M = 0.514, SD = 0.266). 
The fixed effect size for this condition was also moderately high, 0.771. Anonymity, (M = 
0.640, SD = 0.287), B = 0.136, SD = 0.040, t(54) = 3.384, 95%CI[0.055, 0.216], p = 0.0013; 
visibility to the ingroup (M = 0.666, SD = 0.302), B = 0.123, SD = 0.040, t(54) = 3.060, 95% 
CI[0.042, 0.203], p = 0.0034; and visibility to those to whom one was tied (M = 0.600, SD = 
0.290), B = 0.093, SD = 0.040, t(54) = 2.323, 95% CI[0.013, 0.173], p = 0.0240 were also 
significantly different from the condition where players were visible to all participants. The 
condition in which players were anonymous also had a moderately high effect size, 0.671, as 
did the condition in which players were visible to the ingroup, 0.607. In the above three 
significantly different groups, the mean ingroup favouritism was higher than that of the 
comparison category.  
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Figure 10: Identifiability as a main effect on Ingroup Favouritism 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval (CI) around the mean.  The plot is constructed with 
independent CIs (i.e. for the means), which do not and cannot take clustering or repeated measures in a multilevel 
model into account.  Although this plot does not show overlap, this does not necessarily indicate significance (as 
there are many exceptions to this general rule that “no overlap indicates significance”). Generally, plots do not 
show the corrected confidence intervals for the differences between means, but rather show the individual means 
plus the CI (Cousineau, 2017). The CIs for the significance test are what should be relied upon to determine the 
difference between means.  
Post hoc tests for identifiability as a main effect on ingroup favouritism 
Although there was no significant interaction, tests of simple main effects were carried out in 
order to further explore the differences that existed between different conditions of 
identifiability. These were averaged over the levels of status.  
Estimated marginal means (Appendix 10) and pairwise comparisons (Appendix 11) indicated 
that players in the complete anonymity condition (M = 0.66, SE = 0.03) were significantly more 
likely to display ingroup favouritism than those in the condition where players were all visible 
to each other (M = 0.50, SE = 0.03), B = 0.14, SE = 0.040, t(54) = 3.384, p =0.0036. Players in 
the anonymity condition (M = 0.64, SE = 0.03), B = 0.156, SE = 0.040, t(54) = 3.888, p = 
0.0160, as well as players who were visible to only their ingroup (M = 0.62, SE = 0.03), B = 
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0.122, SE = 0.04, t(54) = 3.060, p = 0.0383) were also significantly more likely to display 
ingroup favouritism than those in the condition where players were all visible to one another 
(M = 0.50, SE = 0.03). Those in the complete anonymity condition (M =0.66, SE = 0.03), B = 
0.147, SE = 0.04, t(54) =  3.665, p = 0.0071, as well as those in the anonymity condition (M 
=0.64, SE = 0.03), B = 0.127, SE = 0.040, t(54) = 3.161, p = 0.0294, were significantly more 
likely to display ingroup favouritism than those in the outgroup (M = 0.51, SE = 0.03).  
The emmeans() package in R includes a plot function which allows the user to plot the estimates 
and 95% confidence intervals in separate panels for each condition. The plot for post hoc results 
of identifiability as a main effect on ingroup favouritism can be found in Figure 11. 
Figure 11: Plot of post hoc results for identifiability as a main effect on ingroup 
favouritism 
 
Note: The estimated marginal mean is represented by the dot, and the confidence interval for the mean is 
represented by the blue bar. The red arrow represents the comparison among the means, and if the red arrows 
overlap, it indicates that there is no significant difference between means.   
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Status as a main effect on ingroup favouritism 
Results of the model for ingroup favouritism can be found in Table 5. The descriptive statistics 
for status as a main effect on ingroup favouritism can be found in Appendix 12. Figure 12 
depicts the differences in mean ingroup favouritism between the status conditions, as well as 
error bars for each condition. Confidence intervals for status can be found in Appendix 13. 
The equal status group (M = 0.655, SD = 0.283) was the reference category for comparison. 
The high-status group (M = 0.537, SD = 0.294) in the inequality condition was significantly 
different from the comparison category B = -0.103, SD = 0.026, t(418) = -3.887, 95% CI[-
0.155, -0.051], p = 0.0001, and had a moderate effect size, -0.508. The low-status group (M = 
0.594, SD = 0.306) was not found to be significantly different B = -0.044, SD = 0.026, t(418) 
= -1.682, 95% CI [-0.096, 0.007], p = 0.0932, from the comparison category.  
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Figure 12: Status as a main effect on ingroup favouritism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval (CI) around the mean. The plot is constructed with 
independent CIs (i.e. for the means), which do not and cannot take clustering or repeated measures in a multilevel 
model into account.  Although this plot does not show overlap, this does not necessarily indicate significance (as 
there are many exceptions to this general rule that “no overlap indicates significance”). Generally, plots do not 
show the corrected confidence intervals for the differences between means, but rather show the individual means 
plus the CI (Cousineau, 2017). The CIs for the significance test are what should be relied upon to determine the 
difference between means.  
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Post hoc tests for status as a main effect on ingroup favouritism 
Tests for simple main effects for status were carried out to further investigate the differences 
between groups in the status conditions. Estimated marginal means (Appendix 14) and pairwise 
comparisons (Appendix 15) indicated that players in the equal status condition (M = 0.637, SE 
= 0.016) were significantly more likely to display ingroup favouritism than those in the high-
status condition (M = 0.534, SE = 0.020), B = 0.102, SE = 0.026, t(418) = 3.887, p = 0.0003. 
The plot for post hoc results of status as a main effect on ingroup favouritism can be found in 
Figure 13. 
Figure 13: Post hoc results for status as a main effect on ingroup favouritism 
Note: The estimated marginal mean is represented by the dot, and the confidence interval for the mean is 
represented by the blue bar. The red arrow represents the comparison among the means, and if the red arrows 
overlap, it indicates that there is no significant difference between means.   
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Self-giving 
Descriptive statistics for self -giving over time across the full design 
Self-giving across all conditions showed an increase over time. The group that showed the 
highest self-giving in the first wave (M = 0.217, SD = 0.246), was the low-status group in the 
condition in which players were visible to those with whom they were tied. Closely following 
this, the low-status group in the complete anonymity condition had the second highest initial 
level of self-giving (M = 0.215, SD = 0.328). The conditions in which participants were visible 
to those whom they were tied with, and that in which they were completely anonymous showed 
the largest increases in self-giving. In these conditions, both high and low-status groups showed 
higher levels of self-giving than the equal status group, and these levels increased substantially 
more than in the equal status group. The group that showed the lowest level of self-giving was 
the high-status group in the condition in which players were anonymous (M = 0.01, SD =0.044). 
While this group showed an increase in self-giving over time, the increase was minor. 
Descriptive statistics for self-giving can be seen in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Descriptive plot of self-giving across identifiability and status conditions 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval around the mean.
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Modelling Self Giving 
The data structure was round/time (Level 1), nested in game (Level 2), in participant (Level 3). 
According to the intraclass correlation, 43% of the unexplained variance was nested in 
participant, 24% was nested in game, 6% was nested in time, and 27% was nested in round. 
The model for self-giving included random intercepts and random slopes, and was first tested 
for interactions and then main effects. The three-way interaction (AIC = -1092.6, LogLik = 
589.29) between time, status and identifiability was not significant, however both time F(1, 
48.026) = 47.0893, p = 1.193e-08 and status F(2, 84.766) = 3.7619, p = 0.02721were significant 
main effects, with identifiability not being significant F(5, 48.105) = 0.4837, p = 0.78672. For 
this reason, the three-way interaction was dropped from the analysis, and the two-way 
interactions were tested.   
The two-way interaction between time and identifiability (AIC = -1221.181, LogLik = 
629.5903) was not significant F(5, 53.98) = 0.4248, p = 0.8294 but time was a significant main 
effect in this model F(1, 53.981) = 55.0724, p =  8.551e-10. Similarly, the two-way interaction 
between status and identifiability (AIC = -1178.684, LogLik = 614.3422) was not significant 
F(10, 84.857) = 1.0261, p = 0.42882, however status was a main effect for this model F(2, 
84.860) =  3.3923, p = 0.0383.  
Next, the interaction between time and status – the two significant main effects – was tested. 
Again, the interaction (AIC = -1261.294, LogLik = 643.647) was not found to be significant 
F(2, 100.674) = 0.4825, and both time F(1, 58.018) = 50.8158, p = 1.78e-09 and status F(2, 
100.848) = 3.7214, p = 0.0276 were found to be significant main effects.  
Based on the above, the final model selected included time F(1, 58.965) = 57.9147, p = 2.51e-
10 and status F(2, 100.852) = 3.3749, p = 0.0381 as two main effects, with no interactions 
(AIC= -1278.702, LogLik = 650.3512). Restricted maximum likelihood algorithms (REML), 
were used to obtain estimates of AIC and Log Likelihood, however full maximum likelihood 
(ML) was used for model comparisons. The results for the model for self-giving can be found 
in Table 3.   
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Table 3: Results for Status and Time as Main Effects on Self-giving  
  
Fixed Effects Model coefficients 
Source F Df p  Source B SE T-value P-value 
Time 57.915 1 2.51e-10 Intercept 0.07 0.02 3.046 0.0034 
Status 3.375 2 0.0381 Equality: high vs equal -0.06 0.03 -1.732 0.0876 
 
Equality: low vs equal 0.01 0.03 - 0.218 0.8284 
Random Effects 
 
Time 0.05 0.01  7.16 2.51e-10 
Source Int. (SD) Slope. (SD) R 
 
    
Time|Game 0.116 0.0421 -0.26 
 
    
Time|Game|Particip 0.136 0.052 -0.05 
 
    
Residual 0.013 
   
    
 68 
 
Time as a main effect on self-giving 
Figure 15 depicts the differences in mean self-giving between the experimental time waves, 
with error bars for each wave.  
Time was found to be a significant main effect for self-giving, B = 0.05, SE = 0.01, t(59) = 
7.16, 95% CI[0.036, 0.061], p = 2.51e-10. The main effect for time can be found in Figure 15. 
This indicates that there is a tendency for self-giving to increase over time, which was also 
evident in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 15: Mean self-giving for each experimental time wave 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval (CI) around the mean.  
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Status as a main effect on self-giving 
The descriptive statistics for status as a main effect on self-giving can be found in Appendix 
17. Figure 16 depicts the differences in mean self-giving between the status conditions, as well 
as error bars for each condition. 
The equal status condition (M = 0.195, SD = 0.264) was the reference category for comparison. 
The high-status group (M = 0.139, SD = 0.250) in the inequality condition was not found to be 
significantly different from the equal status group, B = -0.060, SE = 0.035, t(71.65) = -1.732, 
95% CI[-0.128, 0.007], p = 0.007. The low-status group (M = 0.182, SD = 0.298) was also not 
found to be significantly different, B = -0.008, SE = 0.035, t(71.73) = -0.218, 95% CI [-0.075, 
0.060], p = 0.850) from the equal status group. Profile confidence intervals can be found in 
Appendix 18, and bootstrapped confidence intervals can be found in Appendix 19. 
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Figure 16: Status as a main effect on self-giving 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval (CI) around the mean. This plot is constructed with 
independent CIs (i.e. CIs for the means), which do not and cannot take clustering or repeated measures in a 
multilevel model into account.  Although this plot shows no overlap between the high and equal status groups, 
this does not necessarily indicate significance (as there are many exceptions to this general rule that “no overlap 
indicates significance”). Generally, plots do not show the corrected confidence intervals for the differences 
between means, but rather show the individual means plus CI (Cousineau, 2017). The CIs for the significance test 
are what should be relied upon to determine the difference between means. 
 
Post hoc tests for status as a main effect for self-giving 
Tests for simple main effects for status were then carried out to further investigate the 
differences between the unequal status groups. Least squares means (Appendix 20) and 
pairwise comparisons (Appendix 21) indicated that players in the low-status condition (M = 
0.187, SE = 0.028) were significantly more likely to display self-giving than those in the high-
status condition (M = 0.134, SE = 0.028), B = -0.053, SE = 0.022, t(420.33) = -2.38, p =0.047. 
A plot for the post hoc results can be found in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17: Post hoc results for status as a main effect on self-giving 
 
Note: The estimated marginal mean is represented by the dot, and the confidence interval for the mean is 
represented by the blue bar. The red arrow represents the comparison among the estimated marginal means, and 
if the red arrows overlap, it indicates that there is no significant difference between means.   
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Reciprocation 
Descriptive statistics for identifiability as a main effect on reciprocation 
In contrast to expectations, the tied condition had the lowest mean reciprocation (M =  0.08, 
SD = 0.27). Visibility to outgroup also showed low mean levels of reciprocation. The means 
for each condition are depicted in figure 18. The means for each condition can be found in 
Appendix 21. 
Modelling reciprocation using a generalized linear mixed-effects model 
It was hypothesized that in the condition in which individuals were tied to one another, 
reciprocation would increase. Additionally, if reputational theory were supported, 
reciprocation would increase when visible to the outgroup. For this reason, the model included 
only identifiability as a main effect (AIC = 1641.2, LogLik = -812.6), however it was not found 
to be significant.   
 
Figure 18: Means for reciprocation across identifiability conditions  
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval around the mean. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
Behaviour in the intergroup context has been extensively studied in social psychology, with a 
number of competing theories as to the underlying causes for behaviours such as ingroup 
favouritism, selfishness and reciprocation. Deindividuation theory suggests that when 
individuals are submerged in a group and are anonymous, there is a loss of inhibition of 
behaviour, causing them to behave in ways that would usually be deemed socially 
inappropriate. Social identity theorists have suggested that this theory of disinhibited behaviour 
does not provide a sufficient explanation for many of the behaviours observed when individuals 
are anonymous, and have contested deindividuation theory by providing an alternative 
explanation which is arguably more robust. The SIDE model suggests that ingroup 
identification and the salience of social identity affect individual group members behaviours in 
interaction, and that the more salient an individual’s social identity, the more likely they are to 
behave according to group norms. Additionally, the theory suggests that conditions of 
anonymity can either accentuate or attenuate normative behaviour, depending on identity 
salience. When anonymous, and personal identity is salient, individuals are more likely to 
behave according to personal standards – however, when group identity is salient, individuals 
will partake in group normative behaviours. Therefore, when submerged in a group, rather than 
behaviour simply becoming disinhibited it becomes driven by the salient social identity in 
question and will be based on group norms. The SIDE model has been argued to be strategic 
in the sense that ingroup members choose to behave in specific ways in order to advance their 
own group within the social context. In contrast to the SIDE model, reputational theory 
suggests that behaviour is instead governed by an inherent, unconscious group heuristic which 
is based on economic rather than social concerns – therefore behaviour is ultimately driven by 
economic self-interest. According to this line of thought, individuals use a mental shortcut in 
order to avoid exclusion from social groups in which resources are exchanged. This is not based 
on social identity or identity salience, but rather on a default assumption that ecologically 
rational behaviours like cooperation and reciprocity will ensure inclusion in the exchange 
system.  
In different conditions of identifiability, we would expect different behavioural outcomes 
depending on whether deindividuation theory, the SIDE model or reputational theory were 
supported. Under conditions of anonymity, where individuals are not visible to others, 
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deindividuation theory predicts that behaviour will become disinhibited and individuals will be 
more likely to behave in ways which are socially inappropriate; for example in this study, 
individuals within the anonymous experimental condition will be more likely to behave 
selfishly. The SIDE model predicts that when social identity becomes more salient, the 
individual will behave in a group normative way, for example by giving to the ingroup; whereas 
if personal identity is more salient, the individual would behave according to personal 
standards, and behaviour would depend on what those personal standards are – however group 
normative behaviours such as ingroup favouritism would be less likely. Reputational theory 
predicts that when the risk of being excluded from an exchange system is high, an individual 
will avoid behaviours such as selfishness, to avoid exclusion. However, when anonymous, 
there is no longer a risk of being held accountable for behaviour and it could be expected that 
individuals would be more likely to behave selfishly. This condition would provide a strong 
way to test the contrasting theories, especially with regard to the SIDE model and reputational 
theory, as the expected outcomes for each theory differ significantly.  
When visible to the ingroup, both the SIDE model and reputational theory predict that ingroup 
normative behaviours would occur, however the theories differ in their reasoning regarding 
why this is the case. The SIDE model suggests that visibility to the ingroup strengthens the 
salience of social identity, increasing group normative behaviours like ingroup favouritism. 
Reputational theory, however, suggests that individuals behave according to the group 
heuristic, in order to gain access to the system of generalized exchange, and in this view, 
behaviour is based on self-interest rather than salient social identity. As the expected outcome 
is the same for both the SIDE model and reputational theory, this condition does not provide 
as strong a test for contrasting the theories. 
Similarly, visibility to the outgroup would also result in the same expected behaviour for both 
the SIDE model and reputational theory. In this condition, group normative behaviours would 
be expected to decrease. The SIDE model suggests that individuals who are visible to the 
outgroup may attempt to downplay their group membership in order to prevent competition 
from the outgroup. Alternatively, the individual’s social identity may become less salient, with 
personal identity salience becoming more prominent. In both cases, group normative 
behaviours like ingroup favouritism would be less likely. Reputational theory suggests that 
because one is not visible to the ingroup, there is no risk of detection or exclusion when they 
do not behave altruistically toward their in-group. Additionally, direct exchange may occur in 
this condition – when one is visible to those who one receives from, it is more likely that the 
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individual will reciprocate in order to maintain their reputation. In this condition, it is expected 
that ingroup favouritism would decrease. We would also expect direct exchange to take place, 
if reputational theory is supported. With regard to ingroup favouritism, this condition doesn’t 
provide a very robust test for the SIDE model and reputational theory, as the predicted 
behaviour is the same for both. However, if reciprocation is observed, it would provide support 
for reputational theory.  
In the condition where participants are visible to all other players, the behaviours predicted by 
each theory differ. Deindividuation theory suggests that when individuals are visible to others, 
they will be more likely to inhibit their behaviour and only behave in ways which are socially 
appropriate. In this condition, we could expect players will directly reciprocate with those 
whom they receive tokens from. Behaviour according to the SIDE model would depend on 
whether social or personal identity is more salient for the individual. When social identity is 
highly salient, group normative behaviour like ingroup favouritism could be expected; 
contrastingly, when personal identity is highly salient, behaviour will occur according to 
personal preferences. Reputational theory suggests that in a situation where individuals can be 
held accountable for their behaviour in the group context, they will behave according to the 
group heuristic and cooperate with all others in the exchange system. Therefore, indirect 
exchange would be expected. Although the expected behaviours for each theory differ in this 
condition, it does not provide a very good test for the contrasting theories as the SIDE model 
predicts two very different behaviours which are dependent on identity salience, and indirect 
reciprocation is difficult to observe.  
In conditions where individuals are visible to those with whom they interact, reputational 
theory suggests that direct reciprocation would increase. This condition does not provide a 
strong test for the contrasting theories, as the SIDE model and deindividuation would not 
expect specific behaviours in such a condition.  
Status should also be considered when understanding behaviour. It can be expected that 
illegitimately low status group members will be more likely to display ingroup promoting 
behaviour, in an attempt to shift the power differential and improve their group’s standing 
within the social hierarchy. It can therefore be expected that the low status players in this study 
would show higher ingroup favouritism than their high-status counterparts. The status 
condition therefore provides a good test for theories on status and group favouring behaviour.  
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The present study therefore sought to examine the effects of identifiability and status on 
ingroup favouritism and self-giving over time. Additionally, identifiability was examined as an 
effect on reciprocation between individuals in interaction. Following this, support for the SIDE 
model and reputational theory was assessed. 
Ingroup Favouritism 
Although there were no statistically significant interactions, both identifiability and status were 
found have significant main effects on ingroup favouritism. Due to the fact that time was not 
found to be a significant variable affecting ingroup favouritism in this study, as a main effect 
or in interaction with other variables, it wasn’t possible to make extrapolations about ingroup 
favouritism increasing or decreasing over time.  
Different conditions of identifiability result in varied levels of ingroup favouritism 
A number of previous studies have examined anonymous behaviour and its effects on 
individuals in interaction with one another, however, to date there have been none which have 
examined varying conditions of identifiability within a specific social context and made 
comparisons between them. The present study was unique in that it allowed for the examination 
of a number of conditions of identifiability, using a specific, experimental interactional context.  
The results of this study indicate that complete anonymity did in fact result in higher levels of 
ingroup favouritism and normative group behaviour than all other conditions of identifiability, 
supporting H1’s expectations regarding the SIDE model. Tajfel et al.’s (1971) minimal group 
studies took place under completely anonymous conditions, and the results of their work 
indicated that ingroup favouritism was normative in such a context. Tajfel et al. (1971) 
therefore suggested that even when group membership was based on the most minimal 
conditions, group normative behaviour was still likely to occur. Additionally, although Tajfel 
et al.’s (1971) study only allowed participants to award points to either ingroup or outgroup 
members without them personally receiving allocations from either, ingroup favouring 
behaviour was still preferred. The SIDE model suggests that when group identity is highly 
salient, and individuals are immersed in the group, they are much more likely to act in group 
normative ways. The groups in the VIAPPL games for this study were minimal to an extent, 
such that participants were allocated to groups in which they shared a “group colour” with the 
other members of their group. Although this is the case, in both of the anonymity conditions 
participants avatars contained their own webcam photograph, which only they could see. 
Arguably, this could have heightened the salience of personal identity, however, results 
indicated that participants still behaved according to the group norm of giving to the ingroup, 
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which suggests that group identity may have been more salient for them even though there was 
potential for heightened personal identity. These results clearly indicate that when anonymous, 
group normative behaviour is strengthened, supporting the SIDE model. This effect persists 
even when players are not individually accountable for their actions (i.e. when they were 
shuffled to a new position after every round), and where reputational concerns could not have 
played a role. This suggests that there must be reasons other than individual accountability for 
the ingroup favouritism which was observed. 
Both the SIDE model and reputational theory suggest that when visible to the ingroup, 
individuals are likely to cooperate with other ingroup members, therefore ingroup favouritism 
is likely to occur. The results indicated that this was the case, and H2 was supported.  According 
to Noel et al. (1995), individuals who are visible to other ingroup members are likely to display 
behaviours that serve to solidify their position and acceptance within their group, and a 
behavioural norm such as ingroup favouritism serves such a purpose. Reicher et al. (1998) have 
suggested that visibility to other ingroup members often results in group normative behaviour 
occurring, as the salience of group identity is heightened. This condition not only provided 
participants with visibility to their ingroup, but also anonymity to the outgroup. This exclusivity 
of visibility could have amplified group normative behaviours, because participants would not 
be able to find commonalities between themselves and outgroup members as easily. Yamagishi 
and Mifune (2008) similarly suggest that the group heuristic allows individuals to gain access 
to group resources through their cooperation with other group members.  However, they 
suggest that ingroup altruism is driven more by self-interest than social identity – the individual 
is motivated to cooperate in order to avoid exclusion. When they do not cooperate, they run the 
risk of being perceived by other group members as “selfish” or uncooperative, and in turn, may 
be excluded from the generalized system of exchange, losing access to group resources – in the 
case of a VIAPPL game, others would choose not to allocate tokens to them. In the condition 
where participants were visible to other ingroup members, ingroup favouritism was high – 
which was predicted by both the SIDE model and reputational theory.  
Visibility to only outgroup members was expected to result in lower levels of ingroup 
favouritism, for both the SIDE model and reputational theory (H3).  This expectation was 
supported by the results, with the condition of being visible to only outgroup members having 
low levels of ingroup favouritism when compared to the anonymity conditions and being 
visible to the ingroup only. The SIDE model suggests that being visible to outgroup members 
may result in individuals down-playing their group identity in order to avoid competitive 
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behaviours on the part of the outgroup (Klein et al., 2007). Being visible to the outgroup could 
also reduce the salience of social identity (Reicher et al., 1995) and increase the salience of 
personal identity. This in turn would result in individuals not necessarily behaving according 
to ingroup norms, but rather making allocations based on personal standards. When the salience 
of personal identity is high, an individual may identify with individual outgroup members 
based on perceived commonalities, rather than with their own ingroup. This could result in 
lower ingroup favouritism and allocations being made based on personal preference rather than 
ingroup norms.  Additionally, Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) suggest that when one is not 
visible and accountable to the ingroup, the group heuristic is less likely to be followed as there 
is no risk of being “found out” for behaving in a way that is not ingroup altruistic.  
What is particularly interesting about the results of identifiability as a main effect is that 
complete anonymity showed the highest levels of ingroup favouritism out of all the conditions 
of identifiability. While the SIDE model indicates that anonymity can either accentuate or 
attenuate group normative behaviour, based on the literature, visibility to the ingroup is 
generally expected to produce high levels of ingroup normative behaviour. From this, the 
expectation was the visibility to the ingroup would produce the highest level of ingroup 
favouritism, with complete anonymity being less predictable – as ingroup identification was 
expected to vary more between players in this condition, and the salience of social identity was 
therefore expected to be less clear cut. In fact, in this study, visibility to the ingroup actually 
appeared to dilute the salience of social identity when compared with anonymity, in contrast to 
expectations made by the SIDE model. Additionally, it is interesting to note the difference 
between the complete anonymity condition and the anonymity condition, where the only 
difference in the manipulation was the shuffling of participants after every round in the 
complete anonymity condition. Although there was no statistically significant difference 
between these conditions, it is interesting that such a minor manipulation of the condition could 
produce fairly different levels of ingroup favouritism. This suggests that complete anonymity 
and anonymity are quite different – due to the fact that the anonymous players still remained 
in one position throughout the game, their behaviours would still be attributable to them (i.e. 
the player in a specific position) throughout the game, rendering them not quite anonymous, 
but also not personally identifiable. Contrastingly, the complete anonymity condition, where 
players shuffled throughout the game, rendered players to be anonymous as well as individually 
unaccountable, as players had no way of knowing who had moved where in each round.  
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Although the results for identifiability as a main effect provide some support for both the SIDE 
model and reputational theory, it seems as though the SIDE model provides a more solid 
explanation for the high levels of ingroup favouritism in the complete anonymity condition. 
Status effects on ingroup favouritism 
As status is such an inherent part of social life, it has been widely studied in social psychology, 
and in various other disciplines. The present study manipulated status in order to examine the 
differences between equal, high and low-status groups. As the VIAPPL environment provides 
a platform for participants to interact with one another, and for the social situation to evolve 
over time, there is potential for the status quo in any game to be changed over time through 
participant behaviour. This allows for an unstable status environment where participants are 
able to work towards changing their groups relative position in the game by making strategic 
allocations.  
H4 was not supported, as there was no interaction between identifiability and status on ingroup 
favouritism. However, status was found to have a main effect on ingroup favouritism. Although 
there was no statistically significant difference between the low and high-status groups, the 
confidence intervals only just overlap (see Figure 13; Appendix 14), with the low-status group 
showing higher mean ingroup favouritism than the high-status group. Ellemers et al. (1993) 
have suggested that when group status is viewed as illegitimate, individuals from low-status 
groups will be more likely to show solidarity with their ingroup in an effort to change the status 
quo. Due to the fact that there was no legitimate reason given to participants for the inequality 
at the start of the game, low-status group members may have experienced an increase in 
willingness to display “compensatory (or ingroup) favouritism”, as a means of trying to achieve 
some level of fairness. This strategy for social competition would bolster the low-status groups 
ability to create a situation in which they have equal status to, or even surpass the initially high-
status group.  
The high-status group showed the lowest levels of ingroup favouritism.  Although unequal 
status was created on an illegitimate basis in these experiments, the differences between the 
high and low-status groups’ token balances were fairly substantial (with high-status group 
members each having 30 tokens, and low-status group members having only 10).  Previous 
studies using the VIAPPL software have indicated a norm for high-status groups to partake in 
compensatory outgroup giving, and low-status groups to partake in compensatory ingroup 
favouritism, in order to shift the status differential between groups to a more equal level 
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(Durrheim et al., 2016). In these studies, low-status groups tend to show high levels of ingroup 
favouritism, and high-status groups show lower levels. Hays and Blader (2017) have produced 
similar results and in their study suggested that due to the illegitimacy of the inequality, the 
high-status group may undertake compensatory outgroup giving in an attempt to create fairness 
in the social context. 
A similar result was observed by a study by Harvey and Bourhis (2013, Study 2), where those 
who were placed in a high-status group based on chance showed more outgroup favouritism 
than those who were placed in a high-status group based on merit. This supports the idea that 
illegitimate high-status individuals are less likely to partake in ingroup favouritism.  
In the present study, results indicated that participants in the equal status groups showed the 
highest mean level of ingroup favouritism. This is in contrast with results from prior studies 
using the VIAPPL platform (Durrheim et al., 2016). It is possible that in this study, social 
competition resulted in increased ingroup favouritism in the equal status condition. Due to the 
fact that groups began on equal footing, social competition could be a strategy used by 
individuals to try and create positive distinctiveness for their own group (Badea & Jetten, 
2014). While most would argue that this only applies to groups of unequal status, it is possible 
that in a game-like situation where “realistic” competition is likely to be present because 
resources (or incentives) such as money or goods are at stake (Diehl, 1990), this could also 
apply to equal groups. In the present study, participants were aware that they would receive an 
incentive based on how well they did in the game, which may have increased competitive 
behaviour within the equal status groups. 
Self-giving 
In reality, individuals within groups have many more behaviours available to them than simply 
behaving altruistically or antagonistically toward their own or another group.  A distinct part 
of human behaviour involves selfishness. Selfish behaviour is very often seen as taboo, because 
it represents the concern of one’s own welfare ahead of that of others (Le Morvan, 2009). 
Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) suggest that the avoidance of selfish behaviours is important for 
success in interactional systems, especially when these systems involve resources that can be 
shared. For this reason, self-giving was included in the behavioural repertoire for this 
experiment. Although the behaviour was available to participants, they were not informed 
during the instructions that it was possible and deduced that it was possible on their own, 
through the use of trial and error.   
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Results for the present study indicated that time had a main effect on self-giving, with self-
giving increasing over time. This was consistent with previous studies conducted using the 
VIAPPL platform (Durrheim et al., 2016). This suggests that as a game progresses, a norm of 
self-giving emerges for all players.  
In social interaction, Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) suggest that even if there is a small risk of 
detection, players would rather strategically avoid behaving selfishly, because if they are 
detected as behaving in a taboo manner they could lose access to generalized systems of 
exchange. It was hypothesized in H1 that when players were anonymous, they would be more 
likely to behave selfishly due to a decreased risk of their reputation being tarnished, as they 
could not be held accountable for their behaviour due to no one knowing who (or where) they 
were. This hypothesis was not supported however, as identifiability was not found to be a main 
effect for self-giving. The results therefore do not support reputational theory as far as 
anonymity is concerned.   
Status was found to have a main effect on self-giving. No initial hypotheses were made 
regarding status and self-giving. Results indicated that players in the low-status group were 
significantly more likely to display self-giving than those in the high-status group. This is 
interesting as it suggests that “having less” may result in players being more concerned about 
their own welfare than those in high-status groups. When one looks at the results for status as 
a main effect for ingroup favouritism, although the low status group showed higher ingroup 
favouritism than the high status group, they did not show higher levels than the equal status 
group. Previous studies using the VIAPPL platform (Durrheim et al., 2016) have indicated that 
low status groups usually show higher levels of ingroup favouritism than both equal and high 
status groups.  It can be suggested that in this study, the low status group members compensated 
for their status position through self-giving instead of through ingroup favouritism, resulting in 
the high levels of self-giving and slightly lower than expected levels of ingroup favouritism 
(when compared to the equal status group) for the low status group. Similarly, it is possible 
that those in the high-status group showed lower levels of self-giving due to their compensatory 
outgroup favouring behaviour – they chose to rather give to the outgroup, and so were less 
likely to give to themselves.   
Reciprocation 
Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000) suggest that individuals will behave according to a group 
heuristic and will partake in direct reciprocation in a social situation where they can be held 
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directly accountable for their behaviours, and where there is the possibility of sequential 
allocations. Identifiability was, however, not found to have a main effect on reciprocation.  
In H4, it was hypothesised that the condition where players were all visible to one another 
would have high levels of reciprocation. The raw means indicate that this condition had the 
second highest level of reciprocation. Similarly. the raw means indicated that the condition in 
which participants were visible to their ties had the lowest levels of reciprocation across all 
identifiability conditions. This was in contrast with expectations in H5. It was initially expected 
that participants would reciprocate in this condition due to expectations of direct exchange 
(Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000), however this was not the case. However, one cannot make 
extrapolations based on this, due to the effect of identifiability not being statistically significant. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine how identifiability affects behaviour, in order to 
understand whether behaviour occurs as a result of the salience of social identity and the 
audiences to whom one is identifiable; or conversely, due to individuals behaving according to 
a group heuristic which works to maintain their good reputation within the social context in 
order to prevent them from being excluded from group exchange systems and resources. The 
results of the experimental games were examined in order to better understand which theories 
were empirically supported.  
The anonymity condition provided the strongest way to test the contrasting theories, as the 
behaviours predicted by each theory under conditions of anonymity were very different. The 
results of this study appear to better support the SIDE model’s explanation for the effects of 
complete anonymity on behaviour. Most notably, it was expected that players who were visible 
to their ingroup members would produce the highest levels of ingroup favouritism across all of 
the conditions. Interestingly, the results indicated that this was not the case, as complete 
anonymity was the highest scoring condition when it came to ingroup favouritism. This 
suggests that complete anonymity may result in behaviour that is more group normative than 
previously expected. The SIDE model predicts that anonymity can increase the salience of 
social identity and group normative behaviour – and the results of this study clearly support 
this prediction.  
Reputational theory, in contrast, expects ingroup favouritism to be strengthened in conditions 
where players are individually identifiable (i.e. where there are stronger reputational concerns). 
Reputational theory would also suggest that conditions of anonymity should increase self-
interested behaviour such as self-giving due to the lack of accountability for the individual who 
displays the behaviour; and, in contrast, when one is visible or directly accountable for their 
behaviour, there should be very little self-giving. The results of the self-giving analysis did not 
support these expectations and so do not appear to provide much support for the reputational 
perspective.  
The results for reciprocation also failed to provide any support for reputational theories, as 
identifiability was not found to have any effect on reciprocation. It was expected that in 
conditions where participants visible to those who they had interacted with, that they would be 
more likely to reciprocate due to the fact that they would be accountable to their donors – 
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however this was not found to be the case. Direct reciprocation was not affected by conditions 
of identifiability, and so, once again, reputational theory was not supported in this work.  
From this it becomes clear that identity salience, and not individual accountability, provides a 
better explanation for the behaviours which were observed. It can be suggested, then, that 
anonymity promotes group normative behaviour more than being visible to an audience does, 
because it increases the salience of social identity. If we apply the SIDE model to the Marikana 
Massacre which occurred on 16 August 2012, it becomes clear that the visibility of the police 
officers to the external audience may have actually resulted in behaviour that actually 
undermined group norms like “protecting and serving” or “keeping the peace”, instead causing 
the officers to behave in an anti-normative, violent way. Visibility to the external audience, in 
this case, may have made the officers personal identities more salient, and the threat of the 
striking mine workers to their personal safety may have become more of a concern than 
upholding group norms, causing them to react by opening fire.   
In summary, the results of this study provide support for the SIDE model, especially regarding 
anonymity. The anonymity conditions provided a strong comparison of the two theories, as the 
predicted behaviours were vastly different – and only the SIDE model was supported. 
Interestingly, none of the hypotheses which were made explicitly about reputational theory 
were supported. This may suggest that the SIDE model provides a better overall explanation 
for behaviours such as ingroup favouritism and selfishness in the group context.  
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Limitations  
There were several limitations to this study which should be considered when reading the 
findings.  
The first limitation of this study is that the VIAPPL platform is designed to allow participants 
to interact in very minimal contexts, and only allows for a limited range of behaviours to be 
undertaken. Therefore, the findings are not generalisable to real world contexts where there is 
a greater degree of complexity.  
Secondly, we did not include extensive manipulation checks for our experimental 
manipulations. For this reason, we cannot be sure that participants understood the 
manipulations and played the games with this in mind. Future research should include 
manipulation checks.  
Thirdly, this study utilized participants from a specific niche of the population – university 
students – as a convenience sample. As students are generally individuals within a specific age 
range, and from a fairly distinct social category, their behaviours may not be representative of 
the broader population. It is possible that the behaviours noted in this study could be 
unrepresentative of all social groups, and that results could differ if a different, random sample 
were used rather than a convenience sample.  
Thirdly, this study attempted to understand how behaviours were affected by a wide range of 
conditions of identifiability. This resulted in complex analyses with very large numbers of fixed 
effects, which made it difficult to ensure that the models converged (especially with regard to 
self-giving). If a future study were to be conducted, it would be recommended that the 
complexity of the study be reduced in order to ensure that statistical analysis could provide 
clearer, more interpretable and relevant results. Narrowing the focus of the study and ensuring 
that objectives and expectation are clear would help to provide more robust results and a clear 
discussion. It would be interesting to conduct a repeat study in which complete anonymity, 
anonymity and visibility to the ingroup were compared with regard to ingroup favouritism and 
self-giving, in order to determine whether the results could be replicated.  
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Appendix 3: Information letter 
 
VIAPPL - 2016 
Dear Participant,  
This is a research project on intergroup behaviour. It has been approved by the UKZN Human Social 
Science Research Ethics Committee and the protocol reference number is HSS/0143/016M. 
Brief outline of the study: This research study aims to explore behaviour in a social setting. The study 
is electronically based game, played by 8 players, by giving and receiving of tokens.  
 
What you will be required to do: The study will take place in the Psyc Lab.  You will be required to play 
a game, answer some questions on questionnaires and participate in a short group interview afterwards. 
This will take about 45 minutes to an hour of your time.  
 
Voluntary participation:  Your participation is voluntary and you are not being forced to take part in this 
study. The choice of whether or not to participate is yours alone, and there will be no consequences if 
you choose to not take part. You may withdraw from the research at any time by telling me that you do 
not want to continue. There will be no penalties for doing so.  
Anonymity: Although we will ask you to register as a research participant, your responses will not be 
linked with your name or any other information by which you can be identified.  Furthermore, will we ask 
you to take a webcam photo at the start of the game depending on the manipulation; these photos are in 
no way linked to your responses and will not be used for any purpose other than game manipulation. In 
other words, you will remain entirely anonymous and your participation will remain confidential. There are 
no limits to confidentiality. 
Research incentive: Participants will be given an average of R30 cash after completing the study; 
however this will vary depending on the manipulation (i.e. you may get more/less than R30).  
Who to contact if you have been harmed or have any concerns: Although this research involves very 
little risk, if you have any questions or complaints about aspects of the research or feel that you have 
been harmed in any way by participating in this study, please contact:  
➢ Human Social Science Research Ethics Committee: 
Ms. PhumeXimba (ximbap@ukzn.ac.za/ 031 260 3587) 
➢ Project Leaders: School of Applied Human Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal: 
Professor Kevin Durrheim (Durrheim@ukzn.ac.za) 
Ms. Kirsty Klipp (kirst.klipp@gmail.com) 
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Appendix 4: Consent form 
 
Consent form 
I hereby agree to participate in research on social interaction. I am aware of what is required of me, and 
I understand that: 
• I am participating freely and without coercion.  
• This is a research project whose purpose is not necessarily to benefit me personally.  
• I will remain anonymous and my participation in the study will remain confidential.  
• I have a right to withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty. 
• I agree to the results of my participation being used for research and teaching purposes and for 
presentation in reports and at conferences. My name will not appear in any of these documents.  
• I agree to my photo being taken via webcam for game manipulation purposes.  
• I agree/disagree to the discussion at the end of the game being recorded for research purposes.  
 
 
Signature of participant:      Date:__________________ 
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Appendix 5: Experimental procedure  
 
Procedure 
8 participants were let into the lab, and fingerprints were scanned in order to keep a record of 
who had participated and to prevent individuals from participating more than once. 
Participants were asked to draw a number from a bag (1 – 8) and were asked to sit at the 
computer corresponding to the number they had drawn. Once all participants were seated, the 
experimenter asked them to switch off their mobile phones, and read out the information 
sheet to them, and after this requested them to sign and date the consent forms. Consent 
forms were collected, and participants were requested to stay silent throughout the procedure 
and not look around the room.  
Participants were then requested to register an account on the VIAPPL software, and after 
logging in with their credentials, entered in a code which would allow them to start the game. 
After logging in, the participants were instructed to take a webcam photo of themselves.  
The participants were then presented with a dot estimation task, designed to enhance in-group 
identification. They were told that they had been allocated to groups based on their estimate. 
After completion of this task, the participants were presented with a questionnaire asking for 
demographic information.  
After the completion of the questionnaire, the participants were presented with the first trial 
of the game, consisting of two rounds of play. The experimenter instructed the participants on 
how the game worked over these two rounds of play. At the end of the trial, the participants 
were presented with a psychometric questionnaire.  
After completion of the questionnaire, the participants were presented with the second trial of 
the game, consisting of 40 rounds, and were instructed to play the game, without waiting for 
instructions in between from the experimenter. After the 40 rounds were completed, they 
were presented with a post-game psychometric questionnaire (repeated measure of the first, 
with some additional questions).  
Upon completion of the questionnaire, the experimenter recorded each participant’s final 
token balance. The experimenter informed the participants that they had not actually been 
allocated to their group by the dot estimation, but that it had been random allocation. The 
participants were each paid their final token balance and an additional R10.00, signed a 
register of payment and were allowed to leave. 
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Appendix 7:  Descriptive statistics for identifiability as a main effect on ingroup 
favouritism 
Condition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness N 
Visible to All 0.514 0.266 -0.083 400 
Complete 
Anonymity 
0.678 0.321 -0.700 400 
Anonymity 0.640 0.287 -0.353 400 
Visible to Ingroup 0.666 0.302 -0.591 400 
Visible to 
Outgroup 
0.564 0.272 -0.105 400 
Visible to Ties 0.600 0.290 -0.412 398 
 
Appendix 8: Confidence intervals (95%) for Identifiability 
Source Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.491 0.611 
Complete 
Anonymity 
0.075 0.236 
Anonymity 0.055 0.216 
Visible to Ingroup 0.042 0.201 
Visible to Outgroup -0.071 0.089 
Visible to Ties 0.013 0.173 
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Appendix 9: Standardized fixed effect sizes for identifiability and status as main effects 
on Ingroup Favouritism 
Source Standardized Fixed Effect Size 
Intercept 2.73 
Complete Anonymity 0.77 
Anonymity 0.67 
Visible to Ingroup 0.61 
Visible to Outgroup 0.04 
Visible to Ties 0.46 
High-status -0.51 
 
Appendix 10: Estimated marginal means for identifiability conditions 
 
Identifiability 
Condition 
Estimated 
marginal 
mean 
Standard 
Error 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Lower CL Upper CL 
Visible to All 0.502 0.029 59 0.424 0.580 
Anonymity 0.638 0.029 54 0.560 0.716 
Complete 
Anonymity 
0.658 0.029 54 0.580 0.736 
Visible to 
Ingroup 
0.625 0.029 54 0.547 0.703 
Visible to 
Outgroup 
0.511 0.029 54 0.433 0.589 
Visible to Ties 0.595 0.029 54 0.517 0.673 
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Appendix 11: Results for pairwise comparisons of Identifiability as a main effect for 
Ingroup Favouritism 
Identifiability condition B Standard 
Error 
z-value p-value 
Anonymity vs. Visible to All 0.14 0.04    3.38   0.01 
Complete Anonymity vs 
Visible to All 
0.16    0.04   3.89   0.001 
Visible to Ingroup vs Visible 
to All 
0.12    0.04    3.06   0.03 
Visible to Outgroup vs 
Visible to All 
0.01    0.04    0.22   1.00    
Visible to Ties vs Visible to 
All 
0.09    0.04    2.32   0.18 
Complete Anonymity vs 
Anonymity 
0.02    0.04    0.50   1.00    
Visible to Ingroup vs 
Anonymity 
-0.01    0.04   -0.32   1.00    
Visible to Outgroup vs 
Anonymity 
-0.13   0.04   -3.16   0.02 
Visible to Ties vs Anonymity -0.04  0.04     -1.06   0.90    
Visible to Ingroup vs 
Complete Anonymity 
-0.03  0.04  -0.83   1.00    
Visible to Outgroup vs 
Complete Anonymity 
-0.15  0.04      -3.67   0.003 
Visible to Ties vs Complete 
Anonymity 
-0.06   0.04   -1.57  0.62    
Visible to Outgroup vs 
Visible to Ingroup 
-0.11   0.04   -2.84   0.05 
Visible to Ties vs Visible to 
Ingroup 
-0.03   0.04   -0.74   0.98    
Visible to Ties vs Visible to 
Outgroup 
0.08    0.04   2.10   0.29    
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Appendix 12: Descriptive statistics for status as a main effect on ingroup favouritism 
Condition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness N 
Equal Status 0.655 0.283 -0.481 1200 
High-status 0.537 0.294 -0.017 598 
Low-status 0.594 0.306 -0.348 600 
 
Appendix 13: Confidence Intervals (95%) for Status: 
Source  Lower Upper 
Intercept  0.49 0.61 
High-status  -0.16 -0.05 
Low-status  -0.10 0.01 
 
 
 
Appendix 14: Estimated Marginal Means for Status as a main effect on Ingroup 
Favouritism 
Status Estimated 
marginal 
mean 
Standard 
error 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Lower CL Upper CL 
Equal Status 0.637 0.016 54 0.604 0.670 
High-status 0.534 0.020 54 0.493 0.576 
Low-status 0.593 0.020 54 0.551 0.634 
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Appendix 15: Results for pairwise comparisons of Status as a main effect for Ingroup 
Favouritism 
Status B Standard 
Error 
z-value p-value 
High-status vs 
Equal Status 
-0.10264    0.02641   -3.887    <0.001 
Low-status vs 
Equal Status 
-0.04443    0.02641   -1.682    0.2118     
Low-status vs 
High-status 
0.05821     0.02546    2.287    0.0576 
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Appendix 16: Figure showing distribution of self-giving across conditions.  
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Appendix 17: Descriptive statistics for Status as a main effect on self-giving 
Status Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skew N Standard 
Error 
Low-status 0.182   
 
0.298   1.51    480 0.0136 
High-status 0.139   0.250   2.02    478 0.0114  
 
Equal 
Status 
0.195   0.264   1.65  960 0.00853 
 
 
Appendix 18: Confidence Intervals for self-giving 
Source Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.026 0.120 
Time 0.036 0.061 
High-status -0.128 0.007 
Low-status -0.076 0.060 
 
 
Appendix 19: Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals for self-giving 
Source Lower Upper  
Intercept 0.026 0.114 
Time 0.037 0.062 
High-status -0.124 0.006 
Low-status -0.074 0.060 
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Appendix 20: Least squares means for status as a main effect on self-giving 
Status Least squares  
mean 
Standard  
error 
Degrees of  
freedom 
Lower CL Upper CL 
Equal Status 0.195 0.026 67.34 0.132 0.258 
High-status 0.134 0.028 94.33 0.066 0.203 
Low-status 0.187 0.028 94.43 0.119 0.255 
 
 
 
Appendix 21: Pairwise comparisons for status as a main effect for self-giving 
 
Status 
condition 
B Standard 
Error 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
T-ratio P value 
Equal Status 
vs High-
status 
0.0603 0.0354   71.55    1.705   0.2103 
Equal Status 
vs Low-
status 
-0.0076 0.0354  71.63   0.214   0.9750 
High-status 
vs Low-
status 
-0.0527 0.0221 420.33   -2.380   0.00466 
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Appendix 22: Means for reciprocation across identifiability conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identifiability condition Mean Standard Deviation Skewness N 
Visible to All 0.12 0.32 2.38 400 
Anonymity 0.13 0.33 2.23 400 
Complete Anonymity 0.09 0.29 2.81 400 
Visible to Ingroup 0.12 0.32 2.41 400 
Visible to Outgroup 0.11 0.32 2.48 398 
Visible to Ties 0.08 0.27 3.10 400 
